Re the National Film Board’s classic of inept, inaccurate and outrageously expensive filmmaking, No Act of God (NFB Rejects Pressure to Ban Anti-Atomic Film – Nov. 23).

My “demand” that it be withdrawn was not made on the grounds that it was biased and incorrect. The NFB has already acknowledged the first charge and can hardly deny the second in view of the evidence provided it...

The grounds for my complaint were that as the custodian of film footage for Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., the NFB had taken footage and maliciously misused it...

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N.M. Ediger (letter, Nov. 29) accuses the National Film Board of bias in producing and distributing No Act of God, and implies that tax money is going to present problems of nuclear power while none is going to present advantages. This is not so. The NFB distributes at least six films commissioned by Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (i.e., produced with taxpayer money) presenting nuclear power in a very favourable light. If Mr. Ediger is really concerned about equal representation on both sides of the nuclear question, he should be calling for more films on the problems of nuclear power...

With this in mind, it is difficult to take Mr. Ediger’s complaint about one-sided information seriously.

Jan Marmorek
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The uproar over No Act of God is the most recent in a line of political controversies in which the Film Board has been submerged throughout its history. There are perhaps more illustrious predecessors which caused far more furore in their day. Denys Arcand’s documentary on the textile industry in Quebec, On est au coton, was banned in 1971 ostensibly over its factual inaccuracies. But more to the point its position had shocked the textiles lobby into insisting on its withdrawal. The ensuing publicity, apart from establishing Arcand’s reputation, ended in the banning of the film. But numerous video “bootleg” copies were circulated throughout Quebec, and in fact, although under censure, it became one of the most widely seen Film Board films in the province. A year later Gilles Groulx’s 24 heures ou plus was similarly banned, although this time the Board’s management had learned its lesson — it never allowed a composite print to be made, and stored the elements in different warehouses. This film called for the overthrow of the present government, a position that the film commissioner of the day, Sydney Newman, found indefensible, coming as it did from a government agency. There are other interesting episodes, one example being Mick Scott’s The Winner (also known as Albert, la grenouille), made as part of a language training series which gleefully satirized the whole concept of bilingualism. Newman was enraged by it, and Scott describes it as a film “totally in bad taste and meant to be.” It has never been seen outside the Film Board. Another example is Jacques Leduc’s black and pessimistic Cap d’espoir, withheld by film commissioner Hugo McPherson in 1969 described by Leduc as “a film about the despair which floated in the air in Quebec a year before the October crisis. It was about the mutinous violence that existed and about the monopoly over news held by Power Corp.” Arcand succinctly summarized his and Leduc’s position: “The Film Board makes thousands of films to say that all goes well in Canada, that the western wheat fields are very beautiful, that Glenn Gould plays the piano well and that Paul Anka is an extraordinary star. So I think it is just normal that there should now and then be a...
film which says that everything is rotten and that we live in a country that is corrupt from top to bottom.” 2

There are other more insidious, less transparent cases. Don Brittain and John Kemeny’s Bethune was a courageous film, dealing with the famed surgeon, made in 1963-64. The Department of External Affairs was cool to the idea, perhaps afraid of offending the Americans. The Board did not give the film its official sanction. External Affairs refused to carry prints in its embassies. In the mid-sixties, post-Cuba era, it was risqué to admit that there had been a Canadian communist. Robin Spry’s Action: The October Crisis of 1970 had its share of problems. The Board of Governors, amidst other objections, insisted that the final line of narration be dropped. Originally Spry’s script read to the effect: the 1970 crisis involved a painful loss of innocence for Canada; however the question still remains - will Quebec separate? The second half of this statement was taken out, placing the final emphasis on Canada, not Quebec.

In the late fifties, Groulx had made a film on a mining town which was overtly critical of the economic and social realities that dominated this particular community. The people in Normental were shown to be slaves of the mine, dominated by an economic enterprise which did not essentially serve their best interests. Groulx’s original cut of the film ran to forty minutes. But it encountered difficulties, running as it did, counter to the prevailing economic philosophy of the day. Groulx cut the film to 30 minutes but this was still not satisfactory. The board cut it to its present length of 17 minutes, to which Groulx refused to attach his name.

Ten years later Pierre Perrault presented the Board with Un pays sans bons sans! ou Wake Up, Mes bons amis!!! The message was simple: the people of Quebec will be spiritually lost if they do not find a country of their own. Sydney Newman originally allowed the film to be released with a restriction: it could only be shown to audiences that specifically requested it, but not on television or in commercial theatres. This decision was eventually altered by Newman.

Perhaps half a dozen films are not enough to get upset over, but more examples exist. Although the films discussed were made, others were not, and others moreover, were toned down by the filmmakers. Self-censorship is an indefinable process: cumulative experience teaches you where your borders are and how far you can go. To grapple with political censorship at the Film Board necessitates a look at its early history and the lessons it learned.

More than anyone else, John Grierson was responsible for the National Film Board - its structure, its purpose, its function. He wanted it to operate close to the politicians, to be, in effect, the voice of parliament. He saw a great role for film, as a tool for social change, as an educational instrument, as a weapon to spread the democratic word. Yet the financial wherewithall provided the key, since film was an extremely expensive medium. He had two choices: to look to the public or to the private sector for sponsorship. He chose the former, decid-
ing that it would give him more freedom. But as someone spending the public’s money, he was keenly sensitive to the responsibility inherent in that arrangement. When the National Film Board was created in 1939 (as a supervisory board, not a production agency as we now know it) it was to be comprised of a chairman, who was to be the Minister of Trade and Commerce, another member of the King’s Privy Council for Canada, and six other members: three civil servants, and three others from outside the civil service. The potential for political interference was obvious and through the years would become more complicated, particularly when Cabinet policy clashed with decisions of the Board. The chairman, and one other, were both Cabinet ministers, yet they could be outvoted by the Board on matters that contradicted government policy.

But Grierson considered it essential to operate a mere step away from the political forum. Only in this way could the Film Board represent the desire and dictums of parliament, which to him distilled the wishes of the country. The war simplified this relationship to a certain extent, because the will of the people was relatively clear and united as one force—to win the war. However there were problems and they were uniformly of a political nature.

After accepting the job of film commissioner in October 1939, Grierson was faced with an unenviable task. He had to provide films for a country that lacked any real production industry. It’s true that the already existing Government Motion Picture Bureau had a trained staff and equipment, but the Bureau was by this time a tired workhorse, and it lacked both inspiration and drive. Associated Screen News was a steady producer in Montreal, and Audio Pictures was operating out of Toronto. Leon Shelley had formed the Vancouver Motion Picture Company on the west coast, but all of these companies produced little more than a steady diet of newsreels and industrial films. Looking around, Grierson got in touch with Louis de B. Rochemont in an attempt to persuade his prestigious American March of Time unit to feature Canada in one of its monthly releases. Rochemont agreed and a crew was sent to shoot scenes of Canada mobilizing for war. Grierson himself was due to leave for Australia in late January 1940, to complete a project that the outbreak of war had interrupted. A week before his departure, the premier of Ontario, Mitchell Hepburn, launched a bitter attack on Mackenzie King, and denounced the federal government for its failure to conduct Canada’s war duties in the vigorous manner required. Parliament had been summoned for January 25, and on that day King asked for an immediate dissolution and an election on this issue. Grierson had left for warmer climes, leaving his assistant (and future film commissioner) Ross McLean to supervise the March of Time film entitled Canada at War. He had also suggested that the notorious Colonel Cooper, head of the powerful Canadian Motion Picture Distributor’s Association, be appointed acting commissioner in his absence. Grierson obviously hoped to cement further relations with the dominant exhibition/distribution arm of the private sector through this move.

McLean, a staunch Liberal who had edited the publications of the National Liberal Federation in the 1935 election, helped steer the film to depict King in a favourable light. King had nervously appeared before the cameras to give a good account of himself, and recognized that the film’s release at an opportune time would do him no harm. The film was due to appear on March 1, 1940, but J.J. Fitzgibbons, President of Famous Players, who controlled numerous Canadian theatres, warned Hepburn about the film’s possible contents in a letter:

I suggest that you see the March of Time issue to be released March 1st, entitled “Canada at War.” While not planned, the subject matter will prove great political propaganda for the Federal Party.

When Ross McLean went to an Ottawa theatre on the first, after escorting prints of the film from New York, he found to his horror and amazement that the film was not being shown. Colonel Cooper was contacted and he “seemed most anxious to shift the blame around and scouted any idea of politics entering into it, although jokingly saying that as a Tory he would be happier if the film held off a month...”

Meanwhile the film was playing in the other provinces and was overtly used a political propaganda. King was furious with Hepburn and felt that his election chances were being severely damaged in Ontario. King’s administrative secretaries parried back and forth with Cooper and Hepburn, while de Rochemont was outraged that a March of Time film was used as a political football. But King was returned with a massive majority and the storm was over.

The inference that the Film Board was just a mouthpiece for the political party in power was to dog it for years. Two and a half years later Hepburn banned another NFB film. Inside Fighting Canada, part of the Canada Carries On series, was a brief survey of Canada’s contribution to the Allied war effort. Hepburn, although no longer premier of Ontario, was Provincial Treasurer, and the Ontario Censor Board was still within his jurisdiction. On Christmas Eve 1942, Grierson discovered that Hepburn had delayed release of the film. This time Hepburn found inaccuracies in the commentary. There was a reference mentioning that the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan had graduated “hundreds of thousands of flyers.” This was a gross inaccuracy. But the greatest exception was taken to a stirring passage near the film’s finale:

Behind the spires of parliament and the leadership of William Lyon Mackenzie King stands a people disciplined for war. Behind the new national management of price and wage controls, behind the efficiency of Government measures, stand the Canadian people themselves. A people who make a national policy of voluntary service.”

As with Canada at War, the film had been released at a sensitive time. There had been labour strikes and threats of strikes, demands for the resignation of federal cabinet ministers, and a great deal of open criticism of the wartime administration. Under these pressures the King government found it necessary to submit the question at issue to the Supreme Court of Canada by way of what is known as a stated case. Members of the Ontario Censor Board, who classified and censored all new releases, felt that:

“...the National Film Board acted in decidedly bad taste, at least, when it presented the film for censorship at the present time...” It is impossible to suggest that the views of the government, as expressed by its spokesman for ‘Inside Fighting Canada’ could influence members of the Supreme Court of Canada, but the Board must observe that unless the Court sees fit to unanimously and sweepingly support the Federal Government with its
The Film Board seemed to be playing partisan politics again. Grierson's rationale for the inclusion of the King reference was succinct: "It would be strange to Canadians if in a survey of Britain's war effort special care were taken to omit the name of Mr. Churchill." 6 Under pressure, Hepburn and the censor board were forced to back away, and by New Year's Eve the film was surprisingly passed without cuts.

Meanwhile Grierson and Stuart Legg, who provided the creative thrust for many of the Board's films, were directing their attentions to the World in Action series which had immense foreign distribution. The two of them were firmly committed to an internationally-oriented postwar world, and, from the inception of this series, its films examined the social economic and political life of other countries. The philosophy was progressive and novel, largely directed toward potential problems of the postwar world, rather than toward the more immediate war aims of the Allies.

At first there seemed to be little danger in the NFB making films of this type, but criticism began in mid-1943 over The Gates of Italy. The film was attacked for being 'soft' on fascism; one journalist headlined his article: "Will Someone Please Tell the NFB About Fascism." 7 Early in 1944, Our Northern Neighbour was held up by the Quebec Censor Board, because it was strongly pro-communist in its interpretation of Russian history. Questions were asked in the Commons:

There has been a growing suspicion that the film board has become a propagandist for a type of socialist and foreign philosophy; heretofore it was merely an instrument of propaganda for the government... My objection is that we have a national instrument of government that is obviously putting out Soviet propaganda. I feel strongly that it is not the duty of any vehicle of government to put out propaganda concerning any foreign country. The film board should be a Canadian film board and it should put out Canadian propaganda.8

However, Grierson and Legg were not to be halted in their vision of informing people about the future structure of the postwar world. The crisis came in January 1945. It involved another World in Action film, Balkan Powder Keg, and it was again the work of Legg. Historically the territory called the Balkans was political dynamite, Russian long regarding it as an important sphere of influence, and England was most sensitive to any Mediterranean threat. The film was critical of British policies, while concurrently Churchill and King were arguing over the possible use of Canadian troops in this area. To avoid further deterioration in relations between Britain and Canada, King asked that the film be withdrawn. It was pulled during its initial playdates. Grierson was upset by the censure, feeling that a matter of principle was involved. He told his board that the NFB should not become simply a spokesman for the official point of view. His maverick attitude had ironically seen him range across the entire spectrum while in Canada, being accused alternately as an apologist for King, and as a producer of left-wing propaganda.

Grierson was soon off to New York at war's end, but Canada and the spectre of communism were to follow him and seriously affect his career. Igor Gouzenko's defection in Ottawa... would usher in the cold war period, implicate Grierson, and by association, the Film Board. Grierson appeared before the Royal Commission investigating Gouzenko's allegations twice, because a former secretary of his had ostensibly been part of the spy ring, and his name had been mentioned in notebooks uncovered by the RCMP. The entire affair was not kind to Grierson, and the "communist" tag was attached more frequently to the NFB as a result.

The Gouzenko affair damaged the Board's reputation seriously, and no doubt left an indelible mark on the place, affecting decisions as to which films it felt it could, or could not, make. Certainly the scope of NFB films in the immediate postwar period reflects the first shifts. Legg and World in Action had looked at international problems and perspectives. It was natural that the people they trained should continue this work. At first they did, making films about the rehabilitation work of UNRRA and UNESCO in Hungry Minds, Suffer Little Children and In the Wake of the Armies - UNRRA, or the war crime trials in Guilty Men. Grant McLean was sent to China at the request of UNRRA to make The People Between. This type of activity abruptly ceased about 1947 and was never really to be revived until Brittain and Kemeny made Bethune in the early sixties. The Board began to retreat into itself to make films that either directly promulgated Liberal policy, (particularly the sweeping social reforms following the war) or films that were standard scenerics, or ethnographic films with no overt political overtones.

Furthermore the opposition conservatives had, in the Film Board, a good device with which to attack the government. The Cabinet was suspicious of how many communists were actually at the Board. The opposition found time to question myriad details of the Film Board's operation - from taxicab accounts for Grierson and Legg, to the number of phones the Board has on its premises. Suddenly it came to light that the Film Board had sent an employee to China for a film. It was Grant McLean, nephew of the film commissioner, Ross McLean, and the film he came back with was to provide the next drama.

In February 1945, UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) requested that the Film Board record its work in certain parts of Europe and the Far East. Grant McLean was subsequently sent to China in 1946, where he shot footage of Mao Tse Tung and the communist forces in Yenan, as well as of the Nationalist leaders in Nanking, still embroiled in the civil war raging over the country. The People Between portrayed a population caught between these two ideologies. Upon completion of the film, Mike Pearson, at that time Secretary of State for External Affairs, requested that a screening be arranged for him. McLean described what happened in a recent interview:

After the film had been shown, the lights came on, Pearson stood up and said some very nice things about the quality of the film. However he went on to say that the government couldn't allow its release because it indicated, naturally, that there were two governments in China, and he didn't think that Canada should recognize that. Pearson took the view that the Canadian government, I think at the behest of the American government, wouldn't even recognize that the communists existed. It was very unreal, but that was the position that Patrick Hurley and the China lobby was taking in Washington.
The People Between was shelved for years, eventually getting occasional distribution to film societies and study groups. The next crisis would not be so easily dealt with. It was a crisis of major proportions which to some extent crystallized many of the previous problems.

The November 19, 1949 issue of The Financial Post had as its front-page headline: "Film Board Monopoly Facing Major Test?" The article included a long list of complaints about the Film Board, written from the perspective of the private sector, which had continually argued against the existence of the NFB. Furthermore it revealed that the Department of National Defence was no longer using the Film Board to work on "classified" films. Perhaps most damningly it asked the question: "Is the Film Board a leftist propaganda machine?"

The walls quickly came tumbling in. Questions came thick and fast in parliament. Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defence, and minister responsible for the NFB from October 1945 to February 1947, admitted that until the Film Board had had its employees screened for security, no classified material would be given to that organization. In fact, the DND films were being given to Crawley and Associated Screen News. Many people felt that Claxton had become deeply suspicious of the NFB during the Gouzenko period, and that the suspicion had never left him. However, the significance of Claxton's statement took on a different dimension when it was revealed that in the case of the private firms, only those personnel directly connected with classified DND films had been screened, while in the case of the Board, every employee in the organization was to be checked out. Evidently, the government's concern with possible subversion within the NFB went beyond the question of DND films.

This period of the Board's history is one if its darkest. Suspicion and betrayal were rife. Through it all, while it is relatively easy to establish the salient facts, there is a much larger spectre continually in the background.

It seems clear that the attack on the Board represents a concerted effort by a group of small Canadian film producers and laboratories to destroy the Board; and that behind this group stand the most powerful movie interests in the world, located in Hollywood. When Ross McLean succeeded Grierson as commissioner in 1945 he was faced with an awesome task. The transition from war to peace would determine the effectiveness of the NFB as an enduring agency. The growing pains were many — staff was reduced and budgets were cut. The Gouzenko affair had planted the fear of communism in people's minds. Furthermore McLean moved the Board into areas where there were powerful and antagonistic interests at work. The small, but vocal group of Canadian film-producing companies expected the Film Board to disappear after the war was won. When it didn't they felt they were facing unfair competition. McLean was also keen on moving the Board into fiction films and television — veiled threats to the hegemony of Hollywood in the former instance, and its fear of the magic box in the latter. Furthermore, McLean had suggested that the Americans should begin...
to recognize a certain responsibility vis à vis Canada because of their domination of the market, and quotas were mentioned. McLean had seen through the sham of the Canadian Cooperation Project, and was subsequently removed from any further involvement with the scheme.

The Canadian government had its own complaints. Louis St. Laurent had evidence that NFB employees were providing information to the opposition for use in preparing questions in the Commons. Jack Pickersgill, at that time parliamentary secretary to St. Laurent felt that the Board needed to be disciplined. In Quebec, Duplessis had ordered his censor board in 1946 to examine Film Board subjects for content sympathetic to communism arguing that: “The National Film Board diffuses Communism and is showing films encouraging Federal centralization.” Three years later he stopped all distribution of NFB films in Quebec through one of his provincial agencies, the Bureau de Ciné-photographie, because of the suspected leftist bias of the Board. The interests of the government, Hollywood, and Canada’s private producers all coincided — the Board has to be brought down a peg or two, if not totally destroyed.

Ross McLean was the first to go. Conveniently, his term was due to expire in January 1950. It was not to be renewed, although McLean was not officially told this: he found out through the newspapers. His assistant commissioner, Ralph Foster, resigned immediately.

Meanwhile the Board’s employees were going through the screening process. McLean had declared the Board a “vulnerable” agency in May 1949 at the behest of DND. Later that autumn the RCMP returned to McLean with a list of about thirty names. It was suggested that he might dismiss them because they were unreliable. McLean refused until clear evidence of disloyalty had been proved. In many cases he told the people involved and warned them that further measures might be in the air, and he might not be able to protect them. McLean was soon to leave the scene. His successor, Arthur Irwin, inherited the problem. (Irwin goes into what transpired, in an interview in another part of this issue in great depth.) Suffice it to say that it was admitted that three people had been fired. Others apparently had already been let go in mid-1949 according to Robert Winters, the minister responsible for the Board. The public sacrifice had been made. There was no outcry. Morale at the Film Board was rock-bottom. Evelyn Spice Cherry described it as a time:

... of tremendous fear. There were these subtle things going on. We weren’t accused of anything, but it was suggested that some of us were enemies of our country.  

Friends became enemies, distrust was rampant. Some simply turned away from involving themselves in the crisis. Information was scanty as to what was, in fact, happening. Irwin moved quickly into other areas. A management consultant company, Woods and Gordon, submitted their report early in 1950. Many of its recommendations were implemented by Irwin. They involved changes in administrative structure, and finance. The Board was becoming more bureaucratized, more efficient. The civil servants could now begin to understand how the place functioned. Grierson’s practice of employing everyone on three-month contracts was superceded by more permanent means of employment. But Woods and Gordon’s report had another potential use, as Pickersgill explains:

... there had been a security investigation of the employees of the Film Board, to which no publicity had been given because it was hoped the suspicions about a few employees would not be justified. Winters was the minister responsible for the Film Board, and when he wisely turned to St. Laurent for advice Norman Robertson and I were asked to assist him. In addition to the security investigation, we felt that there should be a review of the administration of the Board which might indicate that changes in personnel could be made without injury to individual reputations.

A new Film Act was drafted and passed into law on June 30, 1950. The Chairman of the Board was now to be the film commissioner, and of eight other members, only three were to be public servants — there were to be no Cabinet ministers. The political and parliamentary contact that Grierson so valued was being dismantled. It had created too much controversy. Irwin began to investigate a new home for the Film Board. In Ottawa the Board was too close to the firing range. Montreal was chosen. This would have unforeseen results. The idea was relatively sound, but the eventual site chosen was disastrous. It was miles from the centre of town, and isolated from the creative core.

Late in 1950, Irwin wrote a letter to Vincent Massey, chairman of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences. It explained the reason the Film Board was requesting more money from parliament:

The principal increase is an item of $250,000 asked for the production of films to be used in the battle of ideas between the Communist and non-Communist world. The view was taken that the current conflict between the East and West was essentially a struggle of ideas, that the film medium was one of the most effective for expressing the ideas for which this country stood, and that this country was in a uniquely effective position to operate in this field not being subject to the suspicion which is sometimes directed against our neighbour...

Window dressing? Perhaps. But it was a reflection of how far the Board had come in a couple of years. The program became known variously as the “Freedom” series, or “Freedom Speaks,” and “Democracy at Work.” Although it was felt that the whole concept was three or four years out of date, two people, Guy Glover and James Cowan, were sent to Europe to study distribution problems for the series. Various films were made, or co-opted into the programme, but the scheme gradually died a quiet, innocuous death.

People left the Board, and new employees arrived to ultimately leave their stamp on the place. But as Evelyn Spice Cherry reflected:

The whole nature of the Film Board changed. When one doesn’t wish to fire people, you create conditions under which the worker, if he or she has any self-respect, is eventually forced to resign. And I’m sure this was a method that was used. There is a trend to seek a form of escapism from controversial subject matters and certainly it prevailed among us. And if it’s carried very far you almost get into a condition of ‘nothingness.’ I really do believe that when you’re terribly preoccupied with what a camera can do to create a lot of very beautiful images, you end up with something that really hasn’t much to say — you have reached a period of nothingness.
An extreme view perhaps. After all, the artistic flowering of Unit B in films like **Paul Tomkowicz: Street-railway Switchman**, **Corral**, **City of Gold** and **Lonely Boy** was just around the corner. The québécois filmmakers would make great strides in *cinéma-verité* and go on to challenge the status quo in the sixties. **Challenge for Change** would deal with many specific social, economic and political issues through its films. To a certain extent, it is amazing what can be made at the Board, the freedom that is allowed people. Leaving aside questions of objectivity and bias, one cannot, however, ignore a drift towards self-censorship. This is arguably the most dangerous kind, because it is extremely difficult to perceive and can invariably be rationalized away. Self-censorship in a publicly-funded, government agency is unavoidable. But how far can one go before restraint is imposed? Where are the limits to freedom of expression, and who establishes these largely indefinable parameters? Is one actively encouraged to make films on the borderline, so to speak; or, alternatively, to tread a safer path, away from controversy. A few films have actively explored these limits. But the question remains: if a filmmaker explores the contradictions and mechanisms of his society, how far can he go with his criticism before he is censored? Especially if he is using the taxpayer’s money for his purposes.

2. Ibid.
3. Ontario Archives, RG 3 Box 303. Letter from J. J. Fitzgibbons to Hon. M.F. Hepburn, February 17, 1940.
5. Ontario Archives, RG 3 Box 218. Memo to O.J. Silverthorne.
6. Unidentified newspaper article.
9. Interview with Grant McLean for *Has Anybody Here Seen Canada?*, February 24, 1978.
15. Interview with Evelyn Spice Cherry for *Has Anybody Here Seen Canada?*, December 19, 1977.
18. Interview with Evelyn Spice Cherry for *Has Anybody Here Seen Canada?*