

this kind of "concealment" may, in fact, be "dangerous" because so unacknowledged by the writer himself.

Yet buried within this latest piece of Elder's is an intricate and insightful theoretical argument. Elder is actually contrasting multi-textual non-narrative, non-teleological filmic strategies with more conventional forms of cinematic closure. The cinema that Elder is celebrating (which, since he offers no examples, seems largely to be his own) is a cinema of becoming rather than a cinema of having been; and I agree with Elder that this kind of cinema is immensely important within the realm of theoretical activity for those who have the leisure and the training to appreciate it.

What troubles me is that Elder makes no distinction between the political and theoretical realms and that he has to privilege this "poetic" practice over the more "prosaic" practices of other artists, railing against them and their expositors – Harcourt and Handling – as if they were "dangerous." It is, however, as I have argued, this confusion of discursive levels plus the prescriptive insistence on only one correct for filmmaking for the nation which, were these arguments listened to, would be dangerous.

Elder's cinema is an intensely inward cinema. It involves increasingly an exploration of different states of consciousness and of the relationship of the self to culture. It is, in essence, a philosophical cinema.

Elder's theory, too, has been enormously important. Almost single-handedly he initiated a debate about the types of filmic practice that characterize filmmaking in this country;³ and he has written a definitive account of the essential characteristics of the Canadian avant-garde.⁴ More recently, however, certainly in this latest article, his theoretical work seems designed largely to justify his own filmmaking activity, making it seem monocratic and self-serving.

There can be no cultural health for any nation without a more pluralistic approach than Elder will allow. We do need Elder's cinema and, as Canadians, we can be proud that it was created here. At the same time, most of us want to watch other kinds of films at the movies on Saturday night and on television on Sunday. It would be fine, it seems to me, if some of these films might tell stories in innovative ways and if some of them might be Canadian.

NOTES

(1) *S/Z*, by Roland Barthes, trans. by Richard Miller. (London, Jonathan Cape, 1975). The original French words are *scriptible* and *lisible*.

(2) *How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic*, by Ariel Dorfman & Armand Mattelart, trans. by David Kunzle. (New York, International General, 1975).

(3) "Modes of Representation in the Cinema: Toward a New Aesthetic Model," by Bruce Elder, *Ciné-Tracts* 6, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Spring 1979), pp. 55-61.

(4) "The Photographic Image in Canadian Avant-Garde Film," by R. Bruce Elder in *Take Two*, ed. by Seth Feldman. (Toronto, Irwin Publishers, 1984), pp. 246-263.



by Bruce Elder

The cinema described in my article is not any cinema that actually exists, made either by myself or by any other filmmaker. My own films are far too conceptualized to be the films argued for in my article. More sensitive readers have commented, accurately, that the article is primarily self-critical. (In this respect, it is like my forthcoming film, *Lamentations*.)

But does one accuse Eisenstein of self-interest for formulating and publishing his ideas on montage, because they are ideas which he used in his own filmmaking? Or Vertov, for advocating a documentary practice rather like that in which he was engaged? Or Richter, for expostulating on a "true cinema" whose foundational ideas were derived from his "experiments" in filmmaking? Is Leacock condemned for speaking out for "an uncontrolled cinema" rather like the *cinéma-vérité* he was, at the time he made these statements, in the process of inventing?

For my part, I believe the fact these filmmakers worked out notions of cinema and made films based on the principles they have arrived at gives both their films and their writings a special strength. The co-incident of the principles they expound and the principles they have practiced indicates intellectual integrity. I wish I could say I follow in their path, but, in honesty, I cannot. My own writing has been only an admission of the shortcomings of my own work and a celebration of the strengths of others, the Michael Snows, Jack Chambers and David Rimmers, whose work has been so very rich.

The danger that I pointed out in "The Cinema We Need" was the threat to alternative cinema posed by a failure on the part of professors, critics and theorists to pay any heed to the practice, and even the advocacy of practices which are likely to usurp the avant-garde's claims on the attention of those who are interested in discovering alternatives to the hegemonic

Bruce Elder's films include *The Art of Worldly Wisdom, Illuminated Texts* and the forthcoming *Lamentations: A Monument to the Dead World*.

A vindication

products of Hollywood/Mosfilm. The best rebuttal of my allegation would be to reel off a list of articles that professors and critics have produced on experimental film.

Another option that might have been exercised would have been to claim that, although professors have not actually written about experimental films, they really do recognize its importance. (One can imagine that this rejoinder would be offered to the accompaniment of much huffing and sniffing and wheezing.) I'm afraid that this response wouldn't be good enough either. In this period when Marcel Masse holds the purse strings, whatever cultural activity is not defended to the hilt is given away. Moreover, advocacy of one type of cinema (naturalistic fictions) along with demonstrable neglect of another type (experimental films) indicates a prioritization of practices on the part of professors. In fact, professors have often stated that experimental filmmaking is valuable only as a sort of research program and that its discoveries take on real value only when they are adopted and used by feature filmmakers.

I know experimental filmmakers who have worked for over 15 years now, have done fine work, and still have got none of the attention from professors that is regularly bestowed on mediocre narrative filmmakers. I know of experimental filmmakers who have worked at one-and-a-half or two regular jobs to earn enough money to allow them to make their art and, after years on such a regime, have only found themselves penniless and tired. Looking down from the Olympian heights of a university post, it is easy to pride oneself for a cool overview of things, to chide those of us who are reduced to scuffling to make their art and to upbraid us for using "emotive language."

My piece was not intended to be a contribution to film theory. I do not believe it reads like one. I think, rather, the piece has the rhetorical features of a polemic. Nor was it addressed to bureaucrats. It was written for people who, generally, are committed to developing a distinctive Canadian culture, and it was written to warn them that a type of cinema that I believe has

importance to the cultural life of our nation is being overlooked by nearly all of our cultural advocates. Perhaps, I even hoped to prod them into taking action. I hoped some of them would take a look at the work, think about it and, perhaps, take up the cause. Such interventionist ambitions embarrass me not in the least.

But these points seem to me obvious. Surely not every piece of writing on culture – nor even every piece of advocacy – is addressed directly to bureaucrats. Surely change occurs in many ways, and that one way of effecting change is to develop a cadre of people who are committed to some cause and might eventually challenge the policy-makers.

Now it is true, like all "occasions of speaking", that the telling of stories plays some role in constructing the world in which we live. All sayings act to set up the world shared by all those who speak a common language. But narratives have no particular importance in this regard. Which is not to conclude that all utterances (or, at least, all occasions of recounting a narrative) are equally valuable, since all participate in constructing the world that "a community of speakers" shares. But one would want to ask whether the world erected by one way of speaking might not be preferable to the world erected by some other way of speaking? One would want to ask whether the world set up in narrative does not have deleterious features due to the very nature of narrative? And, even if one answered this latter question in the negative, one would still want to inquire whether the world constructed by the common narratives of our culture is not less humane, less profound, less sensitive to the mysterious than the world set up by narratives of earlier periods in history?

I do believe what Hegel expressed in *Reason In History*, that "Everything that a man is, he owes it to the state; only in it can he find his essence. All value that a man has, all spiritual reality, he has only through the state" and that "No individual can step beyond; he can separate himself certainly from other particular individuals but not from the Spirit of the People." But I do not believe this implies a thoroughgoing moral relativism, since I believe

that there is moral progress – that, for example, the wider range of liberties we now enjoy represents a form of progress. (I also recognize our present condition is characterized by losses, but I do not believe these losses are wholly necessary nor that there is no way what has been lost can still be recovered.)

The derogatory comments pocket-book philosophers have made about Hegel's identification of the Christian-Germanic state of Prussia with the Ideal State do reveal a profound problem in Hegel's philosophy. The Young Hegelians pointed out what they believed was a contradiction in Hegel's thinking. On the one hand, they claimed, Hegel presented the dialectic of history as endlessly restless and as negating whatever exists so as to effect change and bring about progress toward greater rationality; on the other, they pointed out, Hegel seemed to enshrine the Prussian state as the culmination of history. This, too, is a real point, but I think it can be refuted. To do so would be important, for the alternative is moral relativism and I find this alternative abhorrent. I find it abhorrent because it really does entail, that objectively speaking, i.e., independently of participation in a tradition, there is not much to choose between humanitarianism and anti-Semitism. I would develop a counter argument that would depend upon the view that humans become free when they desire that which is truly proper for people to desire. Freedom, in this view, would arise when the human mind participates in the Absolute, when it becomes a living presence in the presence of the Absolute, the eternal world of truth and goodness. I would point out now that this view of freedom differs from the most common view about the nature of freedom, that freedom is the ability to do whatever one's desires prompt him to do, rather than the ability to do what is proper for him to do. I would show that this is an illusory view, because the prescriptions for behaviour that can be deduced from it would lead not to liberation but to enslavement. But I cannot undertake this task here.

In the "modified relativist" theories espoused by most "critical theorists" there, unfortunately, is a contradiction at the heart. For critical theorists argue that the subject is socially constituted and has no being whatsoever outside of "sociality" (as they so inelegantly put it). This would entail that dispositions toward action and judgements develop within and are conditioned by "sociality" and hence that those judgements are relative to that "sociality." At the same time, they petition to higher universal values when formulating a critique of those judgements.¹ This seems contradictory, and most of these "dialecticians" seem to want to avoid commitment to positions involving contradictions whenever they can (although I do not). This should be a reason for them (but not necessarily for me) to reject their positions of modified relativism.

Proposing a value of promoting social cohesion – to which most of us who live in the Sundered human universe of modernity would at least pay lip-service – implies that those who speak out against narrative advocate a practice that would result in social dysfunction. Thus are repressed ques-

tions about the quality of the narratives told in our time and about how their quality compares with that of narratives of other cultures and of other periods in history. I would argue that what promoted social cohesion in earlier historical periods was the shared belief that there was something higher than man which all men served. The narratives people told were grounded in that belief and in a world that had that dimension. Now that source of social cohesion has been forgotten. Our narratives have lost their roots in the realm of the transcendent. Their telling has become a ritual that has entirely lost its inner meaning, just as the ritual of the sacrament has lost its meaning by being interpreted as a social phenomenon. Formerly, the stories people told would allude to God, would speak of the Holy, and would display thoughts and feelings about the Good. Now they rarely do. More often, they reinforce the liberal world view.

Consider how rarely the narratives of the present age deal with ideas outside the ambit of liberalism, how frequently they adopt the standpoint of individualism and deal with problems of "personal" psychology – that is, with problems that develop in the relation to some "significant other" who is a member of the social group to which the individual belongs. Consider how often our narratives depict the individual as the maker of his own destiny, and how rarely the hero of the psychological narrative is depicted as answering the call of the Divine or as responding to the mystery of the Holy. Consider how often the problem of the narrative is the search for "personal" well-being or sexual fulfillment. Consider how often it is the quest for the healing of wounds inflicted on the psyche. Consider how rarely it concerns the Good. Our narratives promote the destitute world-view of liberalism. Our narratives – narrative itself – have become as worthless as emptied-out rituals are. They further the disenchantment of the world. If our works of art are to promote a re-enchantment of the world, they must find new means of working. These means are what "The Cinema We Need" sought. Whatever its limitations (and I acknowledge that they are many), it must be interpreted in this light.

My critics might have responded to this position in three ways. They might have claimed that the most significant films of our culture have retained the relation to transcendent values and do provide us with norms opposed to those of the tradition of liberalism. Secondly, they might have taken on the religious emphasis in my filmmaking and writing because there are, in the main, two available viewpoints from which to criticize this dimension of my work. One is liberalism and the other is its close relative, Marxism. At this point in history, the one appears only slightly more bankrupt than the other, as I think this becomes abundantly clear to anybody who sits down to critique my claims from either vantage point. Thirdly, one might argue along essentialist lines, claiming that even though the narrative has fallen to the state I describe, there is no reason to jettison it, for nothing in its own nature determined its present, fallen state. People adopting this tack would say that narrative has served other

cultures well, and it can serve ours well also.

This last claim has some force. Still, I believe that historical developments have made narrative useless – at least for the purposes I set forth – for our own time, certainly, though perhaps not for all time. They are like rituals that have become meaningless and empty. And just as rituals must be changed when this happens, so must the form of our cinema, if it is to help us rediscover our wonder at the gift of things.

My piece perhaps did not analyze, but certainly did comment upon a type of cinema in which story, representational images, and teleological structures that lead toward closure, interact in a complex manner, in a form one of whose cardinal attributes is the use of a sequencing of events such that the events seem to bear cause-and-effect relations to one another. To repress inquiry into that is to repress inquiry into what the motivation for realism is. I, for one, would argue that the impulse toward realism is connected with the positivist world-view of scientific liberalism. Remember Zola's claims for consistency of his naturalism with the scientific method!

Granted, the use of the realistic style can reveal something that the use of other "styles" cannot, and that is what the type of thinking is that prefers realism. And so we are back to the question of the motivation for realism.

Adopting a line of approach that reduces the nature and function of realistic images and representation to the merely sociological value of revealing how "a certain group of people in a certain place at a certain time" seems to be offered as a final value that puts all other lines of questioning beyond the pale. I, on the other hand, would argue that the thinking (imagining, feeling) of some periods may be richer and more profound than that of others. I also believe that a part of the critical task is to expose the debased character of thinking when it would restrict the critical enterprise to uncovering how people in a certain period "imagined" the world to be, and what such a restriction conceals about representation and narrative.

Barry Barns (in *Interests And The Growth Of Knowledge*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977) provides a useful starting point. "Representations," he states, "are actively manufactured renderings of their referents, produced from available cultural resources and as constructs for use in activity, where 'activity' can embrace the exercise of cognitive functions and where such functions are related to the objectives of some social group." All representations, verbal or visual, are constructs. They don't display the form of the real; Gombrich and Ivens, among others, conclusively demonstrated this. When a representation conveys information about an object, it does so by classifying it, by making it an instance of one or more kinds of entities recognized by the culture whose resources are drawn upon by the process through which representations are constructed. Representations make it possible for existing cultural knowledge to be applied to their referents while the referents themselves provide a check on the development of cultural knowledge.

There are many possible ways to

organize (or to construct) a world – the way our culture does so is just one possible way. Nevertheless, any viable organization, taken as a whole, is systematic and orderly. This is because any "model" world is connected, directly or indirectly, with the performance of some institutionalized activity, such knowledge is (to put my point in a somewhat Habermasian way) prestructured by a "situated technical interest" in prediction and control. Representations are assessed not by their accuracy in rendering the world (or, even, in the appearance of the world), but instrumentally, on the grounds of their efficacy in prediction and control. At least this is how representations have been assessed ever since the time when hierarchic rather than hieroglyphic thinking became dominant. In this way, representations are correlated with the historical development of procedures, competences and techniques. (A.N. Whitehead once made the remarkable observation that the greatest invention of the nineteenth century – and the nineteenth century was the time when liberalism finally achieved its hegemony – was the technique of making inventions.) In sum, representations are artifices, not accurate renderings of their referents – not even of how their referents are imagined to be. They are constructed forms that reflect the predictive, and other technical functions, which representations are required to perform, if procedures are to be carried out and techniques applied.

An analogy can be drawn to the nature of the foundational concepts of modern physics. They were not developed by chance, without sufficient reason. A certain conception of nature, of nature as a complex of forces, as so much energy and power waiting to be exploited, formed our physics into the sort of experimental endeavour it is. Modern science serves to discover the means (the machine techniques) and, more importantly, to clarify the world picture that aids us in our attempts to discover the means to dominate "what-is" (conceived of as stocks of energy for use).

Scientific representations, like all representations, have the form they do as a result of the uses they are put to and the institutional purposes they serve. They do not provide insight into the real nature of that which is brought forth into representation. People often overlook this and take representations as presenting the represented in full presentness. Thinking, by relying on representations that are informed by the institutional purposes they serve, has been converted into instrumental thinking, into reckoning and calculating. But thinking has not realized this about itself. Consequently, representations have come to dominate consciousness to such an extent that all other forms of thinking have been forgotten. The costs of this loss are obvious. What I argue for in "The Cinema We Need" is a form of cinema (and art) which, in small measure, might help restore those ways of thinking that have been lost. That is why I argue (some might say vehemently) against representations and representational thinking. We need to remember those forms of consciousness that have no object.

Representational thinking compre-

hends thinking as the grasping of that which lies before it. This thinking is readily transformed into logical, rational thinking. For rational thought, everything that is, is an object and, being an object, is amenable to subjugation by the will. For such thinking, Being is a mystery that is never revealed, even as a mystery. The mystery of Being can be apprehended only by a tranquil resoluteness that is in no way self-assertive. Such a resoluteness reveals that to which we humans belong. Such thinking does not argue or prove. It produces no ideas that are kept as possessions (or gifts or presents), nor does it result in "clarifying the issues" involved in some disputed subject. In fact, it is no inquiry at all; it is a silent form of conversation which sets up a world we could inhabit, but don't.

Handling, for example, brings out the boogeyman of formalism with which to threaten me. But he writes as though formalism were a broad, comprehensive category comprising everything that is difficult, unliked by the masses and "intellectual" (i.e., not pleasurable or entertaining, as narrative films are). His equation of the ratios narrative/formal, entertaining/intellectual and pleasurable/unpleasurable I find mistaken. There are pleasures that derive from forms other than the narrative. The exercise of intelligence itself affords pleasure – one that becomes more intense as the works which offer such pleasure become more rare.

Handling should take into account that there are formations and there are formalisms. The works of Duras or Syberberg (filmmakers I respect and have thought about a great deal) have nothing whatsoever to do with the cinema I was proposing. They hardly represent the surpassing of representational thinking. The cinema I advocated has similarities to Pound's poetry. In fact, to explain, I would make use of Pound's distinction between phonopoeia, melopoeia and logopoeia. Phonopoeia "trains the object (fixed or moving) onto the visual imagination," melopoeia "induces emotional correlation by the sound and rhythm of speech" while logopoeia "induces both the effects of stimulating the associations (intellectual or emotional) in relation to the actual words or groups of words employed" (*How To Read*, ch. 8). "The Cinema We Need" expresses acceptance, with reservations, of the first (phonopoeia), embraces wholeheartedly the second (melopoeia), and vehemently rejects the third (logocentrism). This is because I believe logocentrism results in representational thinking and that representational thinking eventuates in modern universities – factories for the production of plans for carrying out ideological programmes – and Auschwitz.

The crux of my attack on narrative concerns the link between historicism and realism, an association made through my quote from Pound's *Cantos*. It consists in the claim that histories and realistic narratives alike employ structures that depend on linear order and coherence and so cover over those gaps in our knowledge that represent a threat to the will to mastery.

The constitutive categories of narrative – linear temporality, identity, causality and freedom – are fictions produced by the will to mastery. From

them arise those dominant features of modern Western narratives – bourgeois individualism, organicism, humanism, progressivism – that are the hallmarks of bourgeois culture. To counter the will to mastery, I propose an openness to the contraries of experience to be achieved by an escape from representation. I propose "dialogism" or "polyglossia" which involves the use of the two or more simultaneously present "voices" which interact in a single cultural object. I advocate this because the linguistic diversity it entails may counter the impulse toward a homogeneous language – one expression of which is the narrative, of which Handling and Harcourt are so fond – since homogeneity of language is an important aspect of modernity. The "relativization" of language that would be a consequence of the development of forms possessing this characteristic might help break us out of that cycle of telling and retelling – the equivalent of Marx's "simple reproduction" in the cultural sphere – that is the history of modern narrative. Pound, I keep suggesting, has shown us the way.

I do not believe that what I have proposed as an alternative to realism is formalism but rather a sort of transcendentalism. Nowhere do I propose that the work of art should achieve that ontological autonomy that is a feature of truly formalist works. The closest I have come to that tradition is (a) to base my early films on very simple shapes (though even those films are more in the poetic than in the materialist vein of structuralism) and (b) to include in many of my later films remarks that the maker is the source of those errors and the confusions that haunt any work. Admittedly one could take the use of this latter device as implying that when a work of art achieves the status of an ontologically autonomous object, it transcends failure and becomes "perfectly beautiful." But one could also interpret its use as confession and self-criticism. Similarly, I have celebrated "the death of the author," because, as Foucault has pointed out, though in a different spirit, the removal of the author makes way for the transcendent.

It must be acknowledged, though, that Handling is constrained to argue that avant-garde cinema must remain a marginal practice. The reason for this is revealed in a comment he makes almost in passing: "Narrative, because it is so closely attached to pleasure, cannot simply be dismissed. It has to be subverted from within." One wishes that Handling had elaborated on this comment because it happens to be the reason most frequently given by British critics for dismissing the avant-garde and arguing for (guess what?) – the New Narrative.

It is utter nonsense to say that the avant-garde wants to promote unpleasure. Who, in the '60s, didn't go to avant-garde films to see naked people – more naked people than you could see even in Bergman's films?

Unfortunately, the notion that the political importance of avant-garde cinema is that it foregoes "bourgeois" pleasures is one that has found currency. It is often used as Handling uses it in his article – and indeed as Wollen and Mulvey use it ("Interview with Mulvey", *Undercut*, no. 6) – to damn experimental films by consigning them to the margins. How much unpleasure

would any reasonable person seek out? Of course, I realize we were expected to seek out the "unpleasure" of watching avant-garde cinema (and the experience afforded by films like *Penthesilea* and *Riddles Of The Sphinx* and other "theory films" was really very, very unpleasant) as our political duty and to help us learn some film theoretical notions that would help us, the intellectuals, help the toiling masses. But even a saint's dedication would flag after a couple of viewings of *Penthesilea* (or the unbelievably wretched *The Bad Sister* whose "intellectual" substance is nearly as simplistic as its title). It is hardly surprising, therefore, that after a brief flirtation with the avant-garde, even the nose-to-the-grindstone British were off seeking some "pleasure" – something they believed would be provided, of course, by entertainment – i.e. narrative – movies. Of course, for "entertainment" they substituted "pleasure" in order to align themselves with psychoanalytic terminology – for, by gawd, thought even about sex has to be "serious," "difficult" and "political.") The blatant nonsense once promulgated by British theorists and now become dated, has found its resting place in the courses on avant-garde offered by professors who only read about experimental cinema in *Screen* but never see experimental films. (I do want to add that this comment is not directed at Handling or Harcourt, who do see experimental movies.)

Quite simply, all this just states the darkness of the era: the era of liberalism. The personal has been snuffed out. The mysteries have been forgotten. We might as well buckle under and accept what has been imposed on us by technology since arguments advocating actions against that which results in the forgetting of the Divine and in the distorting of the human are to no avail.

I was quite surprised by "The Cinema We Need" when I wrote it; now, I feel vindicated. In "The Cinema We Need," I pointed out a relation between the cinematic form of the films on behalf

of which Harcourt and Handling have argued and the development of a hegemonic system technology which I take to be the means by which America has gained domination of our culture. I also argued that, because of the strength of the technical thinking, no other form of thinking is now available to us. That Harcourt and Handling both attempt to defend the sort of film they advocate by arguing that my comments on technology are *passéiste* indicates that they do see a relation between the form of cinema they praise and technology – unless, that is, they failed to notice the possibility of denying the connection between narrative and technology. Moreover, Harcourt implies and Handling states explicitly that we must accept that the supremacy of technical thought is the reality of our age, and that attempts on my part to remember other forms of thinking are simply an indulgence in a Romantic yearning for a past.

Handling may be right that the disease our society has contracted may be incurable, but I won't accept that claim without putting up any resistance. I don't think that anyone who values what we will lose as the American domination of Canada is consolidated should. I do think that Harcourt and Handling value our country and our culture. But if they don't want to lose them, they will have to rethink their views on technology. If, after this rethinking, they believe that it is too late to escape domination by technology, they should come out and admit that the battle for Canadian culture is lost.

(The text has been edited from a larger manuscript – ed.)

NOTES

1. There is a way out of this impasse, suggested by Althusser in *Reading Capital and For Marx*, and that would be to contrast the "relative insights" of ideology with the science of historical materialism. But most of the dialecticians whom I have been discussing seem to have rejected Althusser's ideas some time ago.

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