

photos: National Film, Television and Sound Archives of Canada

CBC-TV's opening day

Electronic Free Trade: How the CBC brought U.S. television to Canada

In view of the discussions on free trade, the task force report on broadcasting and the future role of the CBC, it seems appropriate to reexamine the origins of television in Canada and how the CBC participated in the choices then made. It is widely accepted that the CBC played a key role in buttressing Canadian culture and that the current Americanised state of Canadian television was created by government indifference and the cupidity of commercial broadcasters. The following discussion (based principally on the CBC's own corporation records) argues that the CBC's own decisions set the pattern for the future.

by Peter Morris

"They sought it with thimbles, they sought it with care;
They pursued it with forks and hope;
They threatened its life with a railway-share;
They charmed it with smiles and soap."

— Lewis Carroll,

The Hunting of the Snark

Since 1928, Canadian policy on broadcasting has been designed to contain the spillover effect of U.S. broadcasting and to stimulate some measure of Canadian creative contribution to programs. Even though (as Herschel Hardin has recently shown)¹ policy decisions did not always match

Peter Morris, author of *Embattled Shadows: A History of Canadian Cinema 1895-1939*, teaches film studies at Queen's University.

the rhetoric of policy, that rhetoric has never varied. There runs, from the Aird Commission of 1928, through the numerous other commissions and committees and the several Broadcasting Acts, a single principle: Canadian cultural (and, ultimately, political) identity is threatened by U.S. broadcasting.

For example, several of the CBC's discussions on television emphasized this point. If the CBC did not control television, the General Manager noted in 1947, "American television networks would sooner or later invade the south-western peninsula of Ontario up to Toronto and from there perhaps further east to Montreal."² The CBC's television policy statement of 1949 argued that if television were not developed "in line with Canadian needs and conditions ... it will have a negative value, probably a harmful effect, and be almost entirely a means of ultimately projecting non-Canadian ideas and material into Cana-

dian homes in a very forceful way."³

The federal government echoed these concerns (and the Aird Commission) in its March 1949 announcement of a television policy. This policy noted that Canada's proximity to the U.S., its relatively small and scattered population, and the need to contribute further to developing "a truly Canadian entity," meant that "television should be established on a national basis. If television were to be developed exclusively by private enterprise, economic pressures might well cause our visual air channels to become mere carriers of foreign programmes."⁴

Yet, the effect of the CBC's own choices about television were to lead precisely to what the policies were designed to prevent: the absorption of Canadian television into a North American system. Many of these choices were technical or programming ones that politicians assumed had nothing to

do with the continuing thrust of broadcasting policy. Such divisions were left to engineering experts at the CBC and to the CBC's Board of Governors. It was to be those decisions (mostly made internally in the CBC and the Department of Transport) and not government policy that determined the future of Canadian TV. The most fateful of these was the adoption of the U.S.'s television standards in Canada — not at all the self-evident choice it was made to appear at the time. Alphonse Ouimet, the CBC's principal TV adviser (and, later, president), wrote in 1950 following the adoption of the standard: "Any other standard would have erected a television curtain between Canada and the United States ..."⁵ It is a not very amusing irony that so much government policy since then should have been devoted to building various forms of screens, if not a curtain, along the border.

"Technology," wrote Fernand Braudel, "is explained by history and in turn explains history."⁶ Harold Innis would have agreed. His *Empire and Communications* (1950) was published after most of the choices had been resolved. It offers, nonetheless, a salutary commentary on the process during which the CBC's concept of state television would inevitably become *United States* television.

"God and Parliament willing, it should not be very long." (Alphonse Ouimet)⁷

In the late '40s, the CBC was attacked by many newspapers and magazines for "delaying" the introduction of television and denying "millions of Canadians" access to the new communications medium.⁸ It is unlikely the Canadian public was clamouring for something it had never seen. In fact, the pressure came from commercial interests (broadcasters and set manufacturers) who had become convinced TV was the next billion-dollar industry. To some extent, it was those interests that the CBC was resisting. The CBC lived by the ideology of the Aird Report with its insistence that those commercial interests had almost delivered Canada into the lap of American hucksterism.

In any case, the CBC was not "delaying" television. It had a very clear policy and a very clear perception of its own role. At its second meeting in December 1936, the newly-formed CBC Board of Governors adopted a resolution on TV which stated that the CBC was not opposed to the establishment of TV stations provided these were for experimental purposes only.⁹ The Board seems to have been aware that TV was still in an early developmental stage and that the adoption of broadcasting standards at that time could lock Canada into a position from which it would have been difficult to extricate itself. The Board was to use this resolution to reject all applications (several dozen) for television broadcast licenses for more than a decade.

The Board was also staking out a claim to control and regulate TV broadcasting. The Broadcasting Act gave CBC control over all transmissions via "the Hertzian waves" and, since TV used the Hertzian waves and was essentially "radio with pictures," the CBC felt it necessarily controlled TV as well as radio. The Corporation thus neatly preempted any bid by other agencies to control TV. (One of those agencies was the NFB which John Grierson felt was the logical one to control TV.)¹⁰

The CBC was undoubtedly correct about its statutory authority over TV. But this also permitted a certain elision between television and radio broadcasting. The CBC was a child of the Aird Commission and created as an appropriate response to the spillover effect of radio broadcasts from the U.S. All of the

CBC's radio policies were developed in these terms. But, in developing television policy, the CBC ignored the fact that TV is a radically different technology (and not just "radio with pictures") and ignored the possibility that a response other than only "state controlled television" might be more appropriate. Radio broadcasts are relatively unlimited by distance since radio waves are reflected back to earth by the Heaviside layer. The shorter television waves pass through the Heaviside layer and thus limit television broadcasts to a range of about 150 kilometres. One consequence of this is that the potential trans-border spillover effect is much less than with radio. (To make an anarchistic parallel, the Aird Commission was facing a situation with radio somewhat similar to that posed by satellite communications.)

Television also had problems of standards not shared with radio: "lineage" (i.e. definition), fields per second and channels. Britain and the U.S. had been broadcasting publicly before the war with totally different standards. So had Germany, the U.S.S.R. and Japan — though these were small-scale operations. Other standards emerged after the war, different from both the British and U.S. standards.

There was also the question of Very High Frequency (VHF) or Ultra High Frequency (UHF) broadcasting. The British had long opted for VHF considering that its limit of 12 channels was adequate for their needs. In the U.S., though, there was considerable debate in the postwar period over the relative merits of VHF over UHF. The technology of VHF meant that channels of the same or adjacent number had to be about 250 kilometres apart. As a consequence, most areas could receive a maximum of three VHF channels — a situation radically different from that of radio broadcasting with its plethora of frequencies. The proponents of UHF (including CBS which was developing a colour system) argued that the much larger number of channels available on UHF would give better coverage and choice in a manner comparable to that of radio. In 1947, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission selected VHF over UHF, then reversed itself barely a year later and announced a "freeze" on all further channel allocations and, finally, began allocating UHF channels in 1952.¹¹

None of these potential choices were of concern to the CBC in the thirties. It had staked its claim and was prepared to await developments. Somewhat more concerned was J. Alphonse Ouimet, a 28-year-old CBC engineer. Ouimet wrote a memorandum on December 29, 1936 (10 days after the CBC's first decision on TV), urging the CBC to take practical steps toward TV broadcasting, if only on an experimental basis.¹² Before joining the CBC, Ouimet had worked for a private Montreal company experimenting in television and had

himself built a prototype television receiver in 1932. He was one of the few Canadian television pioneers and was to become Canada's most passionate advocate of the benefits of television broadcasting.

The CBC, meanwhile, continued to reject all television applications (including ones for "experimental" stations from radio stations CFRB and CKAC) while itself exploring the possibilities of initiating broadcasting. In 1938, General Manager W.E. Gladstone Murray was authorized to obtain more information.¹³ Gladstone Murray had, in fact, already invited bids from British and American companies for two television transmission systems.¹⁴ The costs involved obviously shocked the Board, though it reached the somewhat curious conclusion that, in Canada, "it would, obviously, be financially impossible for private interests to put on a television service."¹⁵ L.W. Brockington, chairman of the CBC Board, conveyed the results of the CBC's studies to the 1939 Parliamentary Committee on Radio Broadcasting. There had been "premature and inadequate exploitation of the great new medium" in Britain and the U.S.A. CBC policy was to wait for the outcome of television experimentation and, in the meantime, "not to alienate from the public domain any broadcasting rights in television to privately-owned stations or other profit-making concerns."¹⁶

During the war, most work on television was halted. (The BBC's television technicians became radar technicians — it is now known that much of British television research was financed by the military.) The CBC, however, continued to receive television applications (including one from the T. Eaton Co. for three stations) and consistently rejected them on the grounds of its 1936 resolution. In November 1945, however, it took its first step towards TV broadcasting. It was proposed that its budget include an amount of \$1.5 million for the "first stage" of TV (along with funding for FM radio broadcasting). The Board finally agreed to withdraw this item from the budget so that a separate request for TV could be made to the government.¹⁷ This is the first hint of a continuing problem the CBC was to face: the difficulty of financing a state television system. Mackenzie King seems to have been unaware of TV. St. Laurent was indifferent, if not actually hostile.¹⁸ Though there was some support for the CBC among senior civil servants, the federal cabinet generally considered the topic of TV a premature one at best. One curious exception was C.D. Howe — hardly a leader in the cause of Canadian cultural identity — who urged an early start to TV as a means of stimulating Canadian manufacturing.¹⁹ The CBC was aware that, if it were to control TV, it would have to make compromises (at least on the level of cost) that would make it politically acceptable.

At its November 1946 meeting, the Board held a major discussion on TV. Chairman Davidson Dunton had held discussions with the Canadian Association of Broadcasters. The Association had "warmly welcomed" the idea of the CBC establishing stations in Montreal and Toronto that could be shared cooperatively with others. The General Manager (Augustin Frigon) was concerned that, if the CBC did not act quickly, TV would be introduced, "prompted and publicized by manufacturers eager to sell their equipment." The Board decided that "the Corporation should exercise control in this new field from the beginning and should institute the development of television operations as soon as possible." CBC management was authorized to develop plans and estimates.²⁰

Management authorized its television expert, Alphonse Ouimet (now Assistant Chief Engineer) to make a major study of television in Europe and the U.S. from technical, economic and artistic perspectives. Ouimet submitted an interim report in September 1947 and a final one in November 1947 (later updated in 1949).²¹ Ouimet's "Report on Television" is comprehensive to the point of numbing the mind by overload. It discusses the technology of TV, the technical standards then used in various countries and the plans in others; it compares programming and artistic standards in the various systems; and it itemizes capital and programming costs. Finally, it makes recommendations on all three levels for Canadian television that take into account the unique Canadian situation. Ouimet also later summarized his findings in a published article.

It is clear from Ouimet's Report that he considered European technology and programming considerably superior to that in the U.S. The British 405-line system was, in practice, as good as the 525-line transmissions in the U.S. and "BBC film transmissions represent the best television in the world today... much better than both studio and film broadcasts in the United States."²² The French (then experimental) 819-line system gave the best detail. Ouimet also reports, later, on an international conference in Zurich in July 1948 on television standards. (Canada was not represented at the conference — somewhat surprising, given that Canada was then, ostensibly, involved in the same debate.) At this conference, the majority of countries adopted a 625-line standard as superior to both the British and U.S.A. systems and as compromise with the "high definition" 819-line French system. One problem with high definition, Ouimet points out, is that it reduces the number of available channels: an 819-line system would give only six VHF channels. Ouimet here ignores the potential of UHF broadcasting with its much larger capacity. He was to continue to ignore, or dismiss, UHF on the grounds that it was still experimental



• Finally, on air with CBC Television



• A. Ouimet and J.J. McCann pose for camera No. 1



• Alphonse Ouimet, A.L. Bushnell and Walter Powell

and needed more work before it would be viable. (Ouimet was probably reflecting his early experimental background; he had had no practical experience with UHF.) As late as November 1951, the CBC Board was still being advised that UHF needed more testing, even though UHF sets had been available for over a year and the FCC began allocating UHF licenses five months later.²³

Ouimet also reported that European programming and production skills – especially those of the BBC – were vastly superior to those in the U.S. These views were echoed by other CBC personnel later sent to study European and U.S. television.²⁴

Given Ouimet's detailed analysis and conclusions regarding the superiority of European technology and programming, he reaches the somewhat astonishing conclusion that: "Canada cannot in fact economically adopt any other television system than the one used in the United States." There were "obvious economic reasons ... and to secure the paramount advantage of using American programmes on Canadian stations" (emphasis mine).²⁵ Ouimet expanded this argument in his later published article:

*In the first place, a good 525-line picture is good enough, and, for that matter, so is 405. But the adoption of a 525-line definition will enable Canadians to tune in directly to American stations... What is equally important, it will similarly enable Americans to enjoy Canadian television programmes, as many of them now do in the case of radio.*²⁶

This, of course, is the classic free trade argument: we will receive their output, but they will receive ours. In communications, however, it ignores the enormous pressure of information that flows in one direction only from a centre of power.

Ouimet's arguments and recommendations pivot essentially around commercial and economic considerations. Canada, he concludes, could not afford the British or French approach. (The French, says Ouimet, were more concerned with technical development than with establishing a regular service.) Nor was the private enterprise free-for-all in the U.S. likely to be viable in Canada. Canadian commercial interests could not afford to absorb the huge losses generated by television development. "As with radio, we will not find a solution in a straight copy of either the British or of the American system alone, but rather in a well co-ordinated combination of the two."²⁷ In other words, Ouimet was recommending the classic CBC solution as applied to radio (a license fee but also commercial sponsorship), even though television was a problem that demanded a different solution. "The state or the States" may have made sense in relation to the situation the Aird Commission was considering in 1928; it was not necessarily

the solution for television. Beyond this, though, the adoption of U.S. technology was not a necessary corollary of the continuation of Canada's "mixed" system of radio broadcasting into television.

In making his recommendations, Ouimet ignores the fact that Britain and the U.S. had already invested millions of dollars in their own technologies and that large numbers of receivers had already been sold. It was in the interest of everyone concerned (especially patent holders and manufacturers, but also the public) to ensure a continuation of the same system. Canada had made no such investment and, in 1947, even in southern Ontario, the number of receivers owned by Canadians was counted barely in the dozens. Canada's choices in 1947 were wide open: it could adopt the new European 625-line standard; it could opt for the French high-definition system; it could even choose British technology which, even Ouimet admits, was then "the best in the world." Most significantly, it could have selected UHF over VHF – a choice that would have been better suited to Canada's geographic and economic situation. But Ouimet recommends U.S. technology for "obvious economic reasons" and in order to simplify "dealing effectively with interference problems near our common border."²⁸ He recommended this, even though, by adopting different standards, Canada could have taken advantage of the array of technical development that had occurred since the '30s. There were, at least equally compelling, "obvious economic reasons" for adopting standards of our own. Canada would have developed a unique television system insulated from the spillover effect yet not isolated (as Ouimet implies it would be) from receiving and exchanging programs in other countries. Production could not have relied as heavily as the CBC did on the simultaneous telecasting of U.S. programs. Given the mainly live transmissions of the period, more Canadian production would have been emphasized. This would have been more costly but, according to 1951 estimates, not excessively so.²⁹ Further, allowing for sponsorship, the production of commercials and the advertising industry would have been stimulated – something the CRTC later attempted to do. Finally, and not least significantly, it would have stimulated the electronics manufacturing industry – the key reason for C.D. Howe's support for the development of Canadian television.

None of these factors was considered by Ouimet, by the CBC Board or by the politicians. In fact, one of the most curious aspects of this affair is that the issues involved seem to have been debated hardly at all. There were many voices querying a CBC monopoly; plenty questioning the choice of Toronto and Montreal as the first TV stations and a full chorus challenging the use of taxpayers' money. But on the

issue of technology, Ouimet was Canada's television expert and few others seem to have known anything about it beyond generalities. The federal government was primarily concerned with the general issue of whether to license TV at all, the possible costs and the roles of public and private broadcasters. The CBC Board worried most about ensuring the CBC's centrality in whatever system was introduced. The media essentially echoed these same concerns while constantly urging those involved to make decisions as quickly as possible so that Canadians could enjoy the new electronic marvel.³⁰ Such voices as there were to question the technology were muted or ignored. Merrill Denison, as early as 1944, had pointed out that RCA-NBC, with its already high investment and control of patents, was necessarily urging the adoption of the standards it had established even though more advanced systems had already been developed and could be commercially available in 2-3 years.³¹ The CBC's Chief Engineer, G.W. Olive, argued in April 1946 that Canada should adopt high definition UHF television.³² Even though he was Ouimet's superior, his views on television were ignored. Finally, the lone media voice to question the technology at the height of the TV debate was a *Saturday Night* columnist in 1947: "It would ... be the height of folly to install one system if another better system were destined to render it obsolete in the near future."³³

Ouimet, himself, never wavered in his commitment to U.S. technology. He was appointed Co-ordinator for TV in April 1949 and in December recommended buying RCA equipment because, through NBC, CBC personnel could have studio tours.³⁴ Contracts for the construction of television transmitters in Toronto and Montreal were placed, without tender, with two American multinationals. This so incensed the British that they mounted a political lobby to protest the decision. CBC Chairman Davidson Dunton was forced into the lame explanation that the British could not build to American standards. This was hotly denied by the British; for the provision of studio equipment, tenders were called and a British company submitted the lowest bid.³⁵

Ouimet's commitment to existing technology derives, in part, from his own background in early experimental TV. More significantly, it was an essentially pragmatic commitment. Ouimet had an almost messianic faith in the future of TV and had worked hard for more than a decade to ensure that Canada would be among the first countries to enjoy its benefits. By far the biggest obstruction to overcome was the question of cost: not only the expensive capital costs for the installation of transmitters and studios, but also the costs of production – at least 10 times as high as those for radio. This was the


point politicians continually emphasized and the point over which the CBC feared it would lose control of TV to commercial interests. Ouimet's arguments sought to overcome the basic obstruction by emphasizing the utility of being able to draw on easily available technology to the south and at the same time minimize production costs by importing existing U.S. programming. It was, in effect, a "best option" recommendation based on the (unproved) assumption that Canadians wanted TV as quickly and cheaply as possible. The CBC accepted this compromise because it allowed it to affirm its own control of TV broadcasting. However, as Harold Innis (quoting Nietzsche) wrote: "In the long run, utility, like everything else is simply a figment of our imagination and may well be the fatal stupidity by which we shall one day perish."³⁶ As the CBC was soon to learn, once the technology was in place, the form would inevitably follow. And since the technology was American, so, too, would be the form. Alphonse Ouimet, interviewed in 1950, said: "Television is like a fast-moving streetcar. You've got to be moving at a pretty speed yourself if you want to catch it."³⁷ It is also true that if you run after a streetcar, you may not see its destination, board and end up catching the wrong one.

"Canada will have to move in the same direction as the United States."
(John Grierson)³⁸

The first hints of what the future held emerged quickly following the federal government's announcement of television policy in March 1949. A transmission link was established between Buffalo and Toronto before one between Montreal and Toronto. Alphonse Ouimet reported that the CBC's TV Group was "definitely of the opinion we should carry American programmes."³⁹ Even though tentative program schedules drafted by staff at the future Montreal and Toronto stations showed several options that did not include U.S. programs, these options had disappeared by the time both stations began telecasts.⁴⁰ CBC Toronto and, to a lesser extent Montreal (which broadcast half its programmes in French), contained a heavy diet (about 50 percent) of U.S. programs of every kind. As Allan Sangster noted a year after telecasts began:

We have some of the larger American shows, including one or two fairly good ones and a whole raft of the... lowest common denominator comedy shows. This bulk importation may possibly be CBC TV's financial salvation, but otherwise one must look upon it with great misgiving, for by now it has surely been well-established that, excepting possibly in comedy, American TV has little of value to offer.⁴¹

(It is also true that there were many worthwhile Canadian-created programs



• Inauguration of CBFT (Montreal), Sept. 1952.



• CBC Board of Governors, Sept. 8, 1952 on CBC-CBLT's opening day



• Gathering at the General Meeting, Sept. 4-6, 1952

"Adopting U.S. technology in order to save costs led to the CBC becoming a kind of regional affiliate of the U.S. networks and the negation of the very principles under which the CBC had been created and to which it constantly referred."

presented on CBC in the early years but it is not my purpose here to analyse them.) Sangster was correct in pointing to the cost considerations underlying the CBC's importation of U.S. programs. (Even here, though, the CBC had had choices: it could, for example, have reduced the number of hours of transmission as some draft schedules had recommended.) The CBC had decided to go head-to-head against the U.S. stations beaming into southern Ontario (Montreal did not have the same problem). They had decided this even knowing (from CBC technical reports) that the threat of trans-border telecasts was relatively minor compared to radio, (Toronto reception from Buffalo was only "fair") except from stations set up for precisely that purpose.⁴² The CBC's television was essentially, again, a reflection of its origins in the Aird Commission: Canadians could be weaned from a dependence on U.S. broadcasts by a judicious mixture of popular entertainment programs (mostly from the U.S.) and "serious" Canadian programs. They had decided this even though there was then no dependence on U.S. television programs (as there had been in radio) and that such threat as existed in trans-border telecasts was created by the CBC itself. Technology had already generated form, long before CBC TV went on air. In other words, the decision on technology had generated for the CBC a battle with which it was already familiar – the spillover effect from the U.S. Bureaucrats, like generals it seems, constantly fight the previous war.

The CBC's decision to save costs by importing cheap U.S. programs received a rude setback just at the point telecasts were about to begin. The CBC had budgeted on the basis of paying U.S. networks a 15 percent commission on commercials sold in Canada – the standard radio fee. The U.S. networks balked and insisted on 70 percent. They argued that CBC "should be considered an affiliate on the same basis as stations in Buffalo, Rochester, etc." and therefore pay the same fees. The networks disagreed "with the principle of U.S. programs subsidizing Canadian originations by the payment of production facilities charges when said production facilities are not required or used."⁴³ The dispute was eventually settled but, for over a month, CBC live (i.e. non-film) programs were virtually all of Canadian origin.

Since the CBC had no difficulty filling its schedule, it is puzzling why management did not realize it had perhaps been trying to catch the wrong street-

car and opt for a different one. There are two possible reasons. Firstly, on the level of utility, many major sponsors (mostly multinationals) were interested only in buying time for established U.S. programs. The CBC felt it needed this revenue to survive. A second reason, however, is perhaps more persuasive since it also helps explain the larger process of decision-making about TV through which the CBC had passed. Historian Barbara Tuchman (in *The March of Folly*) uses the psychological term "cognitive dissonance" to explain how bureaucratic institutions screen out discordant information. Cognitive dissonance is the tendency "to suppress, gloss over, water down or waffle" issues which would produce conflict or "psychological pain" within an organization. It causes alternatives to be "de-selected since even thinking about them entails conflicts."⁴⁴ It was this cognitive dissonance within the CBC that led it into a trap from which it was never able to extricate itself. Adopting U.S. technology in order to save costs led to the CBC becoming a kind of regional affiliate of the U.S. networks and the negation of the very principles under which the CBC had been created and to which it continuously referred. Attempting to compete for audiences with U.S. stations (a competition the CBC itself instigated) led to the loss of the audience the CBC was supposed to serve. Studies through the '50s showed that about 70 percent of viewers in Toronto watched the Buffalo stations in preference to the CBC – and that this was true even when the CBC was simultaneously showing the same program.⁴⁵ This self-created trap was at the root of all the CBC's later difficulties and influenced decisions concerning the licensing of commercial television and the loss of CBC's regulatory powers over broadcasting. The CBC, indeed, is a classic example of an organization pursuing what Barbara Tuchman calls "policies contrary to its own interests."⁴⁶ It is hardly surprising that one commentator could write in 1960: "As an instrument of national policy... Canadian TV has failed... television today pumps into Canadians three times as much foreign as native philosophy."⁴⁷

In a major speech about television in early 1953, CBC Chairman Davidson Dunton reiterated the CBC's basic policy stance that the CBC was the best agency to control TV:

Some people think that the best way would be to develop Canadian television through the use of non-Canadian material. They're perfectly entitled to their ideas. Perhaps some time they'll prevail. It would be the

*cheapest way to do it. I do think, though, we ought to stop to consider for a minute what that would mean 20 or 30 years from now. There would have been operating in this great medium in Canada mostly a series of pipelines bringing material from outside Canada into Canadian homes.*⁴⁸

In these words lies the first tragic irony of Canadian television. Not only was the CBC developing "Canadian television through the (cost-saving) use of non-Canadian material" and becoming the first of the "pipelines," it was *absolutely unaware* it was doing so. A march of folly, indeed.

NOTES

1. Herschel Hardin, *Closed Circuits: The Sell-out of Canadian TV*. (Vancouver: Douglas and MacIntyre, 1985).
2. Public Archives of Canada (PAC), RG 41 Vol. 616. CBC Minutes, 27 November 1947, p. 1069.
3. PAC, RG 41 Vol. 617. CBC Minutes, 20-22 January 1949, p. 1281.
4. PAC, MG26L Vol. 228. File R1 (Radio and Television 1949-53); *Hansard*, 28 March 1949, p. 2050-1.
5. J.A. Ouimet, "Report on Television," *The Engineering Journal*, 33 (March 1950), p. 173.
6. Fernand Braudel, *The Structures of Everyday Life (Civilization and Capitalism 15th-18th Century, Volume 1)* (New York: Harper and Row, 1981) p. 334.
7. Ouimet, "Report on Television," p. 187.
8. Frank W. Peers, *The Public Eye: Television and the Politics of Canadian Broadcasting 1952-1968* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1979) p. 15.
9. PAC, RG 42 Vol. 615. CBC Minutes, 19 December 1936.
10. PAC, RG 27 Vol. 852. NFB Minutes, 28 December 1944, p. 7-8. Grierson somewhat arrogantly rejects a CBC request for joint NFB-CBC training of television technicians on the grounds that this was the NFB's sole responsibility.
11. A. Frank Reel, *The Networks: How They Stole the Show* (New York: Scribner's, 1979) p. 18-23.
12. PAC, RG 41 Vol. 403, File 23-1-4-1, Pt. 3.
13. PAC, RG 41 Vol. 615. CBC Minutes, 19/20 December 1938, p. 150, 152.
14. PAC, RG 41 Vol. 403, File 23-1-4-1, Pt. 3.
15. PAC, RG 41 Vol. 615. CBC Minutes, 20/21 February 1939, p. 162.
16. Quoted in Peers, *The Public Eye*, p. 5-6.
17. PAC, RG 41 Vol. 615. CBC Minutes, 27 November 1945, p. 766.
18. Personal interview with J.W. Pickersgill, 24 May 1985; Peers, *The Public Eye*, p. 15-16.
19. Ibid; Donald Creighton, *The Forked Road: Canada 1939-1957* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976) p. 235.
20. PAC, RG 41 Vol. 616. CBC Minutes, 18/19 November 1946, p. 912.
21. PAC, RG 41 Vol. 402, File 23-1-4, Pt. 4. "A Report on Television" by J.A. Ouimet, November 1947, revised June 1949; PAC RG 41 Vol. 404, File 23-1-4-3-3. "The Progress of TV in the World" by J.A. Ouimet.

22. Ouimet, "Report on Television," p. 174.
23. PAC, RG 41 Vol. 404, File 23-1-4-3, Pt. 1. Report, 29 November 1951 signed WGR; Report from Radio Manufacturers Association, 22 June 1949. Ouimet does refer in his revised 1949 Report to the likelihood of UHF broadcasting in the near future but doesn't recommend Canada adopt it.
24. PAC, RG 41 Vol. 403, File 23-1-4-1, p. 5 and Vol. 404, File 23-1-4-3, Pt. 2. Reports by Ernest Bushnell, J. Frank Willis and M. Fergus Mutrie.
25. PAC, RG 41, Vol. 401, File 23-1-4, Pt. 4. Ouimet Report.
26. Ouimet, "Report on Television," p. 173. Ouimet also argues, correctly, that Canadians would not want a standard "which would automatically exclude anything else." This blithely ignores the fact that differing technologies did not prohibit the exchange of programs. For example, the BBC and France's ORTF exchanged *live* broadcasts in the mid-fifties.
27. Ibid., p. 176.
28. Ibid., p. 173.
29. PAC, RG 41 Vol. 404, Files 23-1-4-3-7 and 23-1-4-3-9. CBC Toronto and Montreal production cost estimates. One Toronto schedule allowed for 22 3/4 hours telecast at a cost of \$72,445 per month and included 12 hours of U.S. material. A comparable Montreal schedule allowed for 24 1/2 hours at a monthly cost of \$76,000 and included no U.S. material.
30. See especially Blaire Fraser, "Why They Won't Let You Have Television," *Maclean's*, 15 January 1949, p. 12-13, 38-39.
31. Merrill Denison, "What About Television?" *Maclean's*, 15 December 1944, p. 17, 38-41.
32. PAC, RG Vol. 85, File 3-12, Pt. 5, memorandum from G.W. Olive. See also, Vol. 84, File 3-12, Pt. 1, G.W. Olive, "Some Canadian Television Aspects," 11 November 1946.
33. John L. Watson, "Black-and-White versus Color Rivalry Brings Television Stalemate," *Saturday Night*, 22 February 1947, p. 22.
34. PAC, RG 41, Vol. 404, File 23-1-4-3, Pt. 1. "Progress Report on TV Planning," 12 December 1949, p. 10.
35. PAC, RG 41, Vol. 617. CBC Minutes, 10/11 February 1950, p. 1403; 22/23 May 1950, p. 1451; Peers, *The Public Eye*, p. 19.
36. H.A. Innis, *The Bias of Communication* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1951) p. 191.
37. Quoted in Pierre Berton, "Everybody Boos the CBC," *Maclean's*, 1 December 1950, p. 33.
38. John Grierson, "Canada's International Position." Grierson Archive, University of Stirling, File G4:21:13, p. 10.
39. PAC, RG 41, Vol. 404, File 23-1-4-3, Pt. 1. "Progress Report on TV Planning," 12 December 1949.
40. Ibid.; undated report on Toronto TV schedules. Also, Files 23-1-4-3-7 and 23-1-4-3-9 for 1951 draft Toronto and Montreal schedules.
41. Allan Sangster, "On the Air," *The Canadian Forum*, November 1953, p. 182. In one week in November 1953, a Toronto viewer watched 25 hours of Canadian programs, 31 hours of American programs and 9 hours of British. This represents about 48 percent U.S. content. *Maclean's*, 15 January 1954, p. 8.
42. PAC, RG 41, Vol. 404, File 23-1-4-3, Pt. 1, R.E. Santo, "TV Reception in Canada from Adjacent U.S. Stations," 12 December 1951.
43. *Financial Post*, 13 September 1952, p. 2. See also 6 September 1952, p. 1; 11 October 1952, p. 2.
44. Quoted in Barbara W. Tuchman, *The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1984), p. 303.
45. Dean Walker, "Canada's TV Dilemma: The American Influence," *Saturday Night*, 23 July 1960, p. 15-17; *The Canadian Forum*, February 1953, p. 243.
46. Tuchman, *The March of Folly*, p. 4.
47. Walker, "Canada's TV Dilemma," p. 15.
48. A.D. Dunton, "Television in Canada," *The Canadian Unionist*, February 1953, p. 48.