

THE SENSE AND NONSENSE OF APPLEBERT & FOURNIER

Part I: The logic behind government aid to production

by John Roston

Naturally enough, the first impulse on receiving the reports of the Federal Cultural Policy Review Committee (Applebert) and Quebec's Commission d'étude sur le cinéma et l'audiovisuel (Fournier) was to turn to the final recommendations at the back – the bottom line. Those recommendations have the private sector breaking out a bottle of champagne and the public sector reaching for a shotgun. Basically, the recommendations severely curtail the production of films and television programs by public sector agencies such as the CBC, NFB and Radio-Québec. Their production funding is largely transferred directly or indirectly to private sector companies. For example, Applebert recommends that, "with the exception of its news operations, the CBC should relinquish all television production activities and facilities in favour of acquiring its television program materials from independent producers." In making this recommendation, Applebert is trying to solve existing problems in the public sector. What are these problems and will the recommendation in fact solve them? This article attempts to answer that question with respect to the production segment of the film industry. The second part of the article, in the next issue of *Cinema Canada*, will deal with distribution.

Government intervention in culture

The three introductory chapters of Applebert make up about 25% of the report and provide an important insight into the love-hate relationship which government and culture share in our society. "Government serves the social need for order, predictability and control – seeking consensus, establishing norms, and offering uniformity of treatment. Cultural activity, by contrast, thrives on spontaneity and accepts diversity, discord and dissent as natural conditions – and withers if it is legislated or directed." The problems of government support for culture are clearly articulated, but the report stumbles badly when it attempts to solve those problems. The chapters on film and broadcasting suggest that we can make a blind man see by giving him a new hat.

Although Fournier differs radically in its specific recommendations, it similarly gets off to a promising start when discussing the major problems facing the Quebec cinema. With regard to the cultural domination of the western world by the English-language cinema in general and the U.S. cinema in particular, it poses the obvious question. "In this francophone islet of barely 5 million people on a continent of 250 million almost exclusively anglophone inhabitants, is it possible to make the human and financial investments necessary to aspire to play his game?" Unfortunately, like Applebert, somewhere along the line Fournier takes a wrong turn and winds up recommending such extensive and complex government intervention in the film industry

that it creates as many problems as it solves.

The prime objective

Applebert believes that, "the role of the creative artists should be given a special priority." Cultural policy should recognize the creative drive of artists as the essential ingredient of culture. This meshes with a similar conviction expressed by Fournier: "The Quebec cinema will take its place in the concerns of man through creativity, the most daring innovation and the timeliness of its themes." In other words, we want to support films which, above all else; are creative and innovative and don't simply mimic what has been done before.

Applebert's notion is of a shared adventure between artist and audience in which the quality of the exchange is more important than the "sheer size" of the audience. Fournier describes a similar adventure. A film's creative team uses a "harmony of image and sound" to communicate something "so pleasing, so beautiful and so important" that the audience will forego home and piggy-bank just to share it.

Both reports are therefore placing a premium on *quality*: of the artist, of the artist's creative work, of the audience and of the communication between artist and audience. This decision to focus on quality as the prime objective of government intervention in culture is of central importance to the film industry. There may be government support for production to meet other objectives, but it is not the central issue.

Judging quality

Having established the guiding principle for government intervention in film and broadcasting, the reports run into trouble when they try to develop mechanisms to ensure that high quality films

are produced. "Quality" is a slippery term. The reports describe it by using terms such as "cultural value," "creative" and "innovative." Quality implies all of those things, but it also has one essential element which both reports skip over. The simple fact is that we can *only* judge quality when we see the finished product on the screen. Even then we may not be able to define it properly, but we know it when we see it. The reports overlook the fact that it is virtually impossible to establish that a finished film will be creative and innovative from reading the script before it is made. If this is so, then we cannot base government intervention on the mechanisms suggested in the reports such as agencies and committees which listen to ideas, read scripts and then decide whether to support projects.

Applebert recommends that, "The Canadian Film Development Corporation should have its role and budget substantially enlarged so that it may take bolder initiatives in financing Canadian film and video productions on the basis of their cultural value and professional quality." As part of its decision-making process, the CFDC is to be "drawing consistently on the advice of a broad and varied range of film professionals." In short, filmmakers should have their proposals judged by a committee of their peers.

Fournier sets up "La Société d'aide au cinéma" to be run by a five-person committee whose members are prohibited from having any involvement in the film industry. Part of their budget is to be used to support projects which demonstrate "innovation, timeliness and originality." The commercial potential of the projects is not to be considered and juries are to be a part of the decision-making process.

The fact is that we have mechanisms now which use committees to judge

proposals and Applebaum and Fournier are not happy with the quality of what they support. Committees tend to approve projects which satisfy a number of different tastes and points of view – not very encouraging for those innovative filmmakers who want to take creative risks on the leading edge of film production.

The evaluation of quality is essentially a retrospective activity. It can only be done objectively with a finished film. This explains what is really happening when those agencies and committees consider proposals. They look backward rather than forward. They check to see if "established" people are involved in the project. Frequently, "you're only as good as your last film."

Fournier seems to sense a problem, but winds up institutionalizing this backward look as part of the mechanisms which it sets up. Some programs administered by the Société d'aide au cinéma make *selective* grants to reward high quality completed productions. In addition, a second government corporation aids production by making grants *automatically* to producers, directors, screenwriters and others based on such things as the box office receipts of the finished film. These grants help filmmakers who have had an artistically or commercially successful film to make more films. One must ask whether these very complex mechanisms will primarily benefit those willing to take creative risks on the leading edge of film production. Unfortunately, creativity and innovation are not necessarily the exclusive province of established filmmakers and those whose last production was a hit. Some people take time to develop and make a lot of garbage before they do anything worthwhile. Others have one good film in them and, thereafter, really ought to be asked to leave. Still others seem to click on every fourth attempt. There is no accounting for it.

If none of the mechanisms suggested in the two reports put the aid where we want it when we want it there, what other option is there? The point is that the question of whether a particular proposal has that magic combination of the right people with the right idea at the right time can only be answered intuitively in the imagination of a single individual. The best intuition will not be correct every time. Therefore we should appoint a number of individuals, or executive producers, who must be given a substantial budget (in the millions of dollars) and complete authority to approve a fixed number of projects and oversee their production. The government agencies and committees can then develop mechanisms to evaluate the finished products. If the overall quality is not exciting, they can heave out the executive producer and give someone else a chance. Since these productions must be exceptional or the executive producer is automatically out of a job, he or she has a very real incentive to seek out the very best ideas and people whether the latter be long established in the film industry or complete unknowns. The executive producer need

not waste time setting up deals. The money is there to make the films or television programs. These executive producers would clearly have to work in very different circumstances than their counterparts do today. The main question is whether they should be located in the public or private sector.

The public sector

Applebert and Fournier take the public sector to task. Applebert scatters criticisms throughout the report, but the basic complaint is that we pour incredible sums of money into the CBC and NFB and get very little "cultural value" out in return. Fournier is more charitable in tone and carefully enumerates the public sector problems:

- Over-investment in technical services and fixed assets.
- Administrative charges increasing at a faster rate than other costs.
- An awkward supervisory structure with too many subdivided units.
- An excess of human resources.

Questioned even more is the practice of making civil servants out of creative artists. As a result, they get "bogged down." Fournier asks if this is really the best way to "stimulate the creative imagination." Having provided an accurate statement of the problem, the report goes on to conclude that the notions of creation and risk cannot be dissociated. Fournier expresses the belief that governmental agencies are limited in their ability to take creative risks. Nevertheless, one must ask if it might somehow be possible to create a climate which encourages creative risks in the public sector.

Applebert portrays the CBC as aware of the problems, but helpless to do much about them. The NFB doesn't even get that much credit, although Applebert does concede that it has been partially handicapped by not being a crown corporation. Applebert wants both agencies out of program production and in effect recommends the emasculation of both agencies.

With one exception, the public sector problems are administrative in nature. Presumably, the CBC and NFB administrators should be told to come up with solutions pronto or be replaced by others who can. If these people are driving in the wrong direction, we should try pointing it out to them. Applebert is very quick to demolish their car.

The problem of creative artists as civil servants is not easily solved and the reports are correct in attaching considerable importance to it. The CBC, NFB and their unions must tackle the problem head on or perish. Creative artists are as much entitled to financial security as anyone else, but this need not take the form of job security. Professional athletes receive high salaries to compensate for their lack of job security and to pay for retraining if at some stage they cannot find employment in their profession. If they had job security instead, every football team would have to dress one hundred players for every game to keep alive the bizarre fiction that they are all still playing the game.

If CBC and NFB executive producers were given substantial budgets to produce a fixed number of films and programs and were automatically replaced afterwards unless the overall quality of the material produced was exceptional, it might encourage them to take creative risks. They would have the freedom to hire the creative personnel they need for each project within the confines of

THE NFB'S WINTER CAMPAIGN

An interview with James Domville, government film commissioner

by Michael Dorland

On the morning of Tuesday, Nov. 16—the day the Applebaum-Hébert committee's final report was made public—the National Film Board, in a surprise move, welcomed the committee's call for a total revamp of the government film agency as "very credible and creditable."

Though the NFB was the first major cultural agency to respond to Applebert, the initial promise to take its recommendations as positively as possible had already worn somewhat thin one month later. Indeed, the Board would appear to have dug in firmly to wage a long campaign against what an internal document describes as the "culturally bankrupt" Applebert recommendations.

At the Board's Montreal headquarters, a temporary office has been set up to house the Applebaum-Hébert Working Group. This six-man committee will coordinate the Board's formal response to the minister of communications on the subject of Applebert. Scheduled for late December, that document will be only

one of a range of reactions to be used to transmit the NFB position to the government. Other means will include calling upon staff, individuals, friends of the Board and organizations that have worked with the NFB to vocalize their opposition to the dire consequences for Canadian culture that would result from the implementation of Applebert.

Leading the Board's counter-attack is government film commissioner James de B. Domville. Sipping on a Coke, Domville unveiled the grand strategy of the winter campaign.

"The recommendations are so extreme that they risk creating a fortress mentality," Domville told Cinema Canada. "If the purpose was renewal it would have been much more helpful for them to say that and to give the direction of that renewal and discuss it with the people concerned."

"I'm busily trying to tell everybody 'Hey, that doesn't mean we're not going hell-bent for leather for our own re-

newal.' Of course one tries to make the (Applebert) thing as positive as possible. We're saying 'Okay, let's at least make this accelerate our time-table.' But you've got to remember what they're saying in their text is that we don't need a film board at all. Well, that doesn't stimulate renewal, that stimulates massive resistance. That's violent overkill—even more, in a way, than with the CBC (recommendations)."

Renewal is a word one hears often from Domville. It is the word he would probably like to see as the synonym for his term as government film commissioner which began in 1980. And one of the paradoxical consequences of Applebert is that it has acted as a stimulus to that very spirit of renewal that Domville associates with his mandate as head of what he, on the other hand, does admit is "a big bureaucracy."

That is not the only paradox. A keen supporter of the idea of a

THE CFDC VIEW OF APPLEBERT

The film industry as a Strasbourg goose

by Connie Tadros

The Canadian Film Development Corporation can hardly be upset with the Applebaum-Hébert report which recommended that the CFDC be substantially enlarged "so that it may take bolder initiatives..."—and it isn't. As David Silcox, president of the corporation and its sole spokesman concerning the report, sums it up, "the report is very good because it acknowledges that the CFDC should become larger and do more for the private sector."

But that's where the praise stops. Although the report suggests infusing the CFDC with additional funds, these would simply be used to allow the corporation to fulfill its present mandate. "We would be able to do more in video and short films, and in French production," Silcox comments. But these are areas already within the mandate of the CFDC, and lack of recent activity has been simply the result of lack of funds. "Our funding problem seemed so elementary that we didn't feel we had to wait for the Applebaum-Hébert report

before going after the monies," he continues, referring to the CFDC's earlier request for additional funds from the government. As for providing new directions, Silcox finds the report lacking.

According to his analysis, the committee suffered from several problems of perception, and failed to appreciate the realities of the film industry in Canada. These failures, in turn, dilute the impact which the committee's recommendations might have had.


"There's a good industrial base in short films, documentaries, industrial and educational films in this country which is never acknowledged. We keep judging the whole film industry as if it were based on feature films, and the Applebaum-Hébert report contains this same fallacy. It's regrettable," says Silcox. Two thousand certified shorts were produced in 1981, he comments, pointing to the obvious edge which this sector has gained in the international marketplace. With the coming of pay-TV, Silcox would have wished the report had dealt

more adequately with the entire industry.

For instance, he notes that no mention is made of the state of the feature sector following the boom and bust of the capital cost allowance era. In the report, the assumption is that the privatization of the production sector would solve the problems of big bureaucracies like the National Film Board and the CBC. "Big organizations like those can always be run more productively," he admits, but this is not to say that the private sector could easily absorb their staffs and functions. Confident that the private sector could eventually do the job of program production, Silcox suggests that "absorbing a very large shift would take time," and faults Applebert for failing to deal with the upheavals such a transfer of production responsibility would entail.

Fundamentally, the report does not deal with the nature of the production done in the public sector. "There is no

Film Board counter-attacks



cultural review committee – “cultural development in this country should be dealt with in the same breath as your energy policy, foreign posture and your economic policy; that is, as a continuing dossier in cabinet” – Domville finds himself in what he terms “a quandry” over Applebert.

“I find myself at the same time rejecting every recommendation to do with film and broadcasting in their specifics, yet endorsing many of the principles announced in Chapter Two,” he says.

As Domville sees them, those principles are four: the primacy of culture for its own sake; the concentration on the individual artist “as the fountainhead of our cultural goodies”; the concern for access by the Canadian public “to our cultural creations”; and “the articulate reaffirmation of the arm’s length principle” that distinguishes between the making of intellectual property and the government of the day.

But, Domville adds, “it’s very difficult to understand how Applebert got from there to a number of their practical recommendations since they do analyze the film scene in quite valid terms.”

At the heart of Domville’s rejection of the Applebert recommendations lies the still unclarified nature of public-private sector limits. If strictly applied, Applebert’s recommendation to take both the CBC and the NFB out of production would effectively silence Canada’s public-sector voices; at any rate, such is the threatening perception seen by the Board. The paradox is heightened by the fact that, as Domville puts it, the private sector has “been making other people’s Grade B movies and been a failure at it, culturally, economically and fundamentally.”

“Yet,” he continues, “having recognized the problems, what Applebert is saying is more of the same. Their concentration on the commercial entertainment film seems to blithely ignore every other

form of audio-visual expression,” notably the documentary and the animated film, the two forms upon which the Board’s worldwide reputation rests.

There is in Applebert, says Domville, a central vision of the Board as a centre for experimentation and training that he can recognize: “I think their vision is possible, especially since I’m the one who brought it forward, that is still dependent upon a film board that is a public-service producer and distributor.

“Having said that the central vision is research, experimentation and training – but not having understood the inter-relationship of that to a production centre – they then said ‘How can we remove all the bits and pieces, all the periphery, to allow the film board to concentrate of that?’ But then they tended to fall into the bureaucratic trap of moving the bits and pieces from here to there. For example they say – quite rightly – the public should have more access to our 43 years of film. Well, that’s why we’re busily trying to create a National Film Board cablevision service.”

In specific recommendations – from reorganizing community film distribution to farming out sponsored film production – Applebert, charges Domville, “is either talking of a view of the Film Board of 10 years ago or are unaware of the developments of the last few years.” And on other topics – such as the Board’s positive impact on regional filmmaking – Applebert is “noticeably silent.”

“One of its biggest sins is that they totally ignore the problems of a dual language country. There’s no mention of a vision which says ‘The central English filmmaking problem is thus-and-so and the central French filmmaking problem is thus-and-so and these are the measures that you take,’” Domville says.

“Again, talking about commercial feature films as if the last few years hadn’t existed, they totally ignore the major

change and departure from old policy in the Film Board – just part of our renewal – and they’re inferring that there’s no renewal at all and it’s still the *status quo* from the ‘60s at the Board. Well, one of the major changes we’ve made, which would have been thought of as extremely radical a few years ago, is our policy of coproducing feature films with independent producers in the country, but using our resources to coproduce those scripts we think are good, scripts that are authentically revealing of this country.

“That’s why we’re up to our necks in the coproduction of Gabrielle Roy’s *Tin Flute*; that’s why we coproduced *The Wars*. And we’re continuing to do that with certain important films that try to counter-balance an image of this country which is pretty strange – and these are films that’d never get off the ground unless you put together all the possibilities available in this country. I mean the state bank, independent production skills and know-how, private investors, the public sector pre-sale or coproduction possibilities on the networks – and including the skills and resources of the National Film Board. I don’t think; no, I know goddamn well *The Wars* could not have been put together without the Film Board.”

Ultimately, Domville says, “the biggest disappointment in the whole film section is that all these recommendations don’t add one film or one audio-visual creation...”

“If one thinks the central problem, in the era of the total proliferation of signals and audio-visual consumption, that our only defence as a nation is not to put up barriers – and we’re not the sort of country that does anyway – but is instead to add to the volume of high-quality programs that people will want to watch, that gives them a real choice, that’s going to give our creators a real chance to express themselves, all those recommendations don’t address themselves to that question – which is far beyond the Film Board’s role.

“All those measures don’t address themselves to that or to the question of access to a domestic market (if you’re dealing in private sector terms) – all it’s done is rearrange the players on the board, but it hasn’t attacked any of the systemic problems.

“If we have sins let’s cure the patient. They’re taking the patient and saying he’s got a headache, so we’ll give him a transfusion. So they pump the blood, a bit into the Public Archives, a little to CBC, a little here and there... and the patient dies.

“What happens now is that, in a little more coherent form, what I’ve just been saying is going to be conveyed to the government.

“It’s not enough to say Applebert is all wet and that they’ve missed the boat. We’ll have to be as imaginative as possible, not just in terms of articulating our role within the total creative film scene but also in saying those things for which we think we should stand up and be counted within any federal government policy to do with film.”

With less than a year to go before the Board’s cable network goes on the air, “the crunch,” says Domville, “has come. And it’s only in round two that we’re going to get people concerned with the life of the Board.”

That’s probably as close to a declaration of war as you get. One thing’s for sure: there’s no coproduction in this Film Board version of *The Wars*.

their budget allocation. All of them would be given adequate compensation instead of job security. Responsibilities of both administrators and executive producers would have to be carefully defined, but it might just work. The alternative is to try to establish such executive producers in the private sector, where both reports believe that creative risks can best be taken.

The private sector

Fournier admits that large- and medium-size companies in the private sector have their problems. “Their very size, their diversification, their profit and productivity imperatives, the tendency to protect themselves, to minimize risks, to tone down some of their boldness, constitute so many possible restraints on creativity.” On the other hand small production houses, while ready to take risks, lack financial stability. Fournier hopes that, with some “consolidation” of existing production and distribution companies, a happy balance can be found. Moreover, these private sector enterprises can produce materials in quantity more economically than the public sector.

Quantity of production has a particular importance in the Quebec context. Fournier bemoans the dominance of American films and television programs in Quebec and refers to “the undeniable bond which today unites the cinema and national identity.” Quebec must therefore greatly increase its volume of film and television program production to counter the threat to national identity posed by imports. In fact, it could be argued that the hidden theme of Fournier is really a preoccupation with quantity at the expense of quality if push comes to shove.

In addition to the complex system of production grants discussed earlier, Fournier recommends that a new “Régie du cinéma et de la vidéo” be given considerable funding and sweeping powers to regulate production and distribution in the private sector. Producers would require special permits as would non-Canadians wishing to shoot material in Quebec. These recommendations are well-intentioned, but they create a bureaucratic nightmare, a sort of film police. The Régie would require a large staff and this would create opportunities for the unsavoury nonsense long associated with liquor permits. In fact, the Régie would suffer from many of the public sector ailments which Fournier enumerated so carefully earlier.

Applebert says little about the constraints on creativity to be found in the private sector. It suggests that some private sector projects of “cultural value” would be supported by an “enlarged” CFDC without expectation of any return on the investment. The CFDC would be advised by a committee of “film professionals.” One can only hope that the CFDC to which Applebert refers resembles the existing one in name only. Applebert’s draft report stated that, “the CFDC became a banker looking to investment brokers for recoupment instead of concerning itself with quality of production.” The last part of that sentence was dropped in the final report, but the fact remains that the executive producers who have become established with the help of the CFDC are not generally known for the creativity and innovation of their productions. It would be nice if the CFDC had more to show for their use of whatever little

funding has already come their way.

Applebert would apparently keep executive producers at the CBC, but their actual production work would be done by the private sector. If one is to hold an executive producer responsible for the quality of the finished program, one cannot give her or him only partial control over the production of that program. Sooner or later one is bound to find executive producers accusing some of the private sector contractors of harming quality by cutting corners to increase profitability.

Applebert falls into the trap which has plagued the CFDC for so long when it states, "Good films can also be profitable ones." That is literally true, but it also implies that one can pursue both quality and profitability equally. In fact, sooner or later they conflict and one must be chosen over the other. Applebert was on stronger ground earlier when it asserted that film policy should be "motivated by cultural goals and only secondarily by industrial or commercial ones."

The private sector must make profitability its prime objective if it is to survive. Government intervention can help. Applebert recommends continuing the Capital Cost Allowance and Fournier recommends boosting it to 150%. The 150% CCA is an Australian invention and has been credited with making possible the high-quality feature films which have been so well-received around the world. In fact, the 150% provision was only passed very recently at a time when the Australian film industry seemed to be slowing down and looking for a hit. The CCA is a good idea, but it falls into the category of industrial and commercial incentives. CFDC grants should be used to encourage cultural goals such as quality. However, if direct government subsidies are provided to pursue potentially unprofitable high quality projects, these projects must always be treated as a sideline by the private sector. To do otherwise is to make survival conditional on continued subsidies - a most dangerous situation for the private sector. In a few cases, the private sector can excel at quality production even if it is treated as a sideline. However, when one looks for the single-mindedness of purpose necessary for the taking of creative risks, one must ask whether the obstacles to be tackled in the private sector do not exceed those to be overcome in the public sector.

Conclusion

None of this should be taken to infer that executive producers and creative artists must work in one sector or the other. They should be able to work in both. It is a question of what their main preoccupation will be while they are working in a particular sector. The private sector preoccupation must be with profit and this generally means an emphasis on quantity rather than quality. The transition from one sector to the other should be seen as an opportunity for renewal, to stir up the waters, to change mental asylums. Our potential is incredible - not just to make great films, but to do so over a long period of time.

Ideally, one would hope that if government aid to production puts an emphasis on quality, this would eventually create a demand for increased quantity. The distribution segment of the industry is crucial if that is to happen. Both Applebert and Fournier have a great deal to say about distribution and their comments will be examined in the next issue of Cinema Canada.

CFDC view of industry

short-term fix. You can't create and write important stories instantly, on command. W.O. Mitchell, Margaret Atwood or Margaret Laurence represent a lifetime of learning and producing. In a way, the criticisms of the Film Board are based on a lack of understanding of that very principle. Perhaps there are other Norman McLaren's there who need a place where they can create and produce." The CFDC does not wish to see the Board done away with, and neither would most Canadians, Silcox thinks.

What he does find appropriate in the Applebert report is the wish to allow the private sector to have a chance to produce good cultural programming. But it is wrong, he believes, to perceive the private sector as one solely interested in the production of commercial films. Nevertheless, he sees no real incentives in the report that would help the private sector move toward the cultural area.


"It's not as sophisticated as I would like it to be," he comments, referring to the film chapter whose "constricted view" fails to come to grips with the very real problems of the industry.

"The report recommends that the capital cost allowance or some equivalent should be continued to encourage private capital in film. You can't use just one regulatory instrument to encourage the industry. You need a number of instruments which are sensitive to the industry itself." The CCA was fine, he concedes, but only dealt with the production end of the business. "It didn't look at the complete cycle from production to post-production, to distribution and exhibition, to sales in other markets which return to the producer. You need incentives or encouragement in each of those areas if you're going to develop an integral and well-articulated industry. You can't shove it all in one end like the Strasbourg goose. It isn't like that."

In the light of the actual federal context and an imminent federal film policy, on which staffers and task forces at the department of Communications have been busy since last spring, the Applebert report, in his opinion, doesn't do much to advance the debate. Take distribution, for instance. "The report makes a fairly generalized, motherhood statement. Extending loans, which we're already doing, doesn't solve the problem. There are other ways of getting at distribution problems, but that takes a large, industrial strategy. The film chapter just doesn't come to grips with what film is in our society. It bites off these little chunks, like the CFDC and the Film Board, but it doesn't provide a context for a film policy for the country."

Communications minister Francis Fox has been working on a film policy, and that policy may or may not reflect the views of the Applebert committee. In Silcox's view, that committee offers "no convincing arguments as to either changing priorities or reallocating funds within the general area."



















The CFDC, he says, hopes to do better. Currently, it is preparing a response to the Applebert report. Believing that the CFDC should enjoy a budget similar to that of the Board, Silcox says the private sector wishes more activity in all areas, and would not support the dismantling of the NFB. The CFDC report, he hopes, will be "a major determinant in the film policy. We are trying to provide a better context [for such a policy] than Apple-



baum-Hébert seemed to."

Certainly, as the major beneficiary of a report which, otherwise, he faults down the line, Silcox and the CFDC are

under an obligation to provide a more convincing context in which to see the Applebert recommendations about the film corporation become law.

 Louis Applebaum, Chairman	 Jacques Hébert, Co-chairman	
 Albert Breton, Vice-chairman	 Ted Chapman, Vice-chairman	
 Joy Cohnstaedt	 Guy Robert	
 John M. Dayton	 Jean-Louis Roux	
 Denis Héroux	 Mary Pratt	 Sam Sniderman
 Robert E. Landry	 Rudy Wiebe	 Alain Stanké
 Elizabeth Lane	 Thomas H.B. Symons	
 Hilda Lavoie-Frachon	 Max Tapper	

OTTAWA - Pre-Christmas sales of the Applebert report - the parting shot of the Federal Cultural Policy Review Committee released Nov. 16 - were doing brisk business, according to its publisher the department of Supply and Services.

As of mid-December, out of a total print-run of 11,924 English copies, 10,000 of which were being offered for sale, 4994 copies had been sold. In French, 3636 copies were printed, of which 3000 were put up for sale, and 2135 had already been sold.

In English, Applebert had sold 49.94% of available copies as compared to 71% in French. Each copy is selling for \$9.95.

"It's doing very well," commented a department spokesman.